Security and the State

Security and the State
Security was identified by Susan Strange as one of the four key structures for identifying a State’s power base. Combining the development of nuclear technology either for civilian or military use makes a weak unstable State very strong within the international system. If it is left to its own devise it can be perceived as a security threat. If not administered correctly and a nuclear incident results, the potentially strong State becomes an ecological and humanitarian issue domestically, regionally and internationally. Placing it in the failed State status and providing a security quagmire for the international system. Its coercive power, if strategic nuclear asset monitoring by a designated international organisation ceases increases significantly as the State suddenly has access to a strategic bargaining tool. This situation has been exemplified by North Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel, Libya and Iran. Each State although not recognised as major powers have since their development of organic nuclear weapons been able to command a better position when negotiating issues with the superpowers. They have also, through their defiant stance, escalated regional conflict. Cross border conflict or domestic accountability for these State’s has not warranted the implementation of international intervention.(refer footnote 1)

Nuclear technology and resources are also very attractive to the various non-State actors operating within the complex interdependence web that is the current international system. Without the behaviour of the State being checked by an international organisation or abiding by a set of rules and regulations agreed upon within the framework of an institution it would be difficult to go forward with effective nuclear accountability on an international level. (refer footnote 2) This is a necessity for consideration as the occurrence of an incident has the potential to place an economic and ecological burden on the State, the region and the international community. The international institution would need to be binding of all States to an agreed form of regulation that ensures the mutual interests for the international community. It would need to ensure that the collective security in the face of uncertainty on an international level is implemented as an insurance against the occurrence of a nuclear incident. (refer footnote 3)

With regards to strategic nuclear assets, international liberalism encourages the legitimisation of an international organisation, the United Nations. The United Nations would provide the avenue for decision-making and policy formulation on nuclear issues. The current dynamic security requirements that are associated with the implementation of international liberalism within both a nuclear and terrorism age warrants the empowerment of an arm of the United Nations, the IAEA, to ensure that internationally implemented and recognised rules and regulations are maintained by all States equally. The governing rules for the IAEA would also need significant reform to ensure that the IAEA could provide the necessary assurances to the international community that if there was a possibility of a nuclear incident occurring that it would have the necessary resources and legitimacy to take all action necessary for prevention.

If effectively designed and empowered, this institution would ensure that issues in relation to nuclear technology and resources would not be swayed by power politics but would be reflective of the needs for global sustainability as opposed to State survivability. With the IAEA coordinating the research and development for nuclear technology on a global scale, transparency would be paramount, there would be no burden placed on smaller States for research and development but there would be a burden placed on the larger States to provide the funding and resourcing for research and development.

States would not be equal in obligation but would be equal in benefits, restrictions, and legislation and in abiding by the associated regulations. This is not in place of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty but is in addition to the treaty. There is still a need to reduce the number of nuclear weapons globally, identified by the continual funding being placed through the IAEA for the disarmament of previous Soviet nuclear weapons. To ensure that all States continue on this path of disarmament further jurisdiction provided by the States through the United Nations for the IAEA to enforce the principles of the nuclear non-proliferation policy need to be implemented. This would ensure the States survivability and ensure the prevention of a nuclear incident.

Footnotes

1 Pakistan and India with their continued conflict over Kashmir has not warranted international intervention or prevented super powers as with Russia, United States or France in assisting them with their development of civilian nuclear power industries, even though they have military nuclear power industries that are in contravention to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. North Korea’s, development and testing of a nuclear weapon after pulling out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a history of not allowing IAEA inspectors to inspect its nuclear facilities provided grounds to gain support from neighbouring states to negotiate United States policies that North Korea identified as hostile. Israel although having a sophisticated conventional military has only been able to maintain a stable and influential position for negotiation in the Middle East due to its nuclear armament as its conventional forces are significantly out numbered by the neighbouring Arab states. Each state mentioned is not recognised by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty as a Nuclear Weapon state and their development of a nuclear weapon’s program is in contravention of the treaty but has not prevented them from developing or receiving international support from the international community for the development of a civilian nuclear program. Similarly, humanitarian issues have been noted for each state, resulting in the international community providing support and aid to each state to alleviate the humanitarian issue. The nuclear issue with the states has provided each state with a better positioning for bargaining within the international system to ensure security against intervention. Security that in the long term and current state of world affairs with non state actors gaining an interest in nuclear technology and that do not have accountability to constituent, could result in nuclear incidents that have global ramifications.
2 The issue of nuclear accountability came into question with the fall of the Soviet Union and the movement, misplacement and unaccounted for nuclear weapons and fissile material identified within the previous borders of the Soviet Union. The international community has been actively pursuing the accounting, securing and destroying of these assets since the fall of the Soviet Union at a significant economical and security cost to those States involved.
3 Robert Obrien, Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics. 2004. New York. p28. Robert Keohane, a liberal institutionalist identified that international institutionalism was developed as a critique of realist/power politics/economic nationalist approaches to international relations and international political economy as they bolstered cooperation and through this cross border dialogue between officials outcomes are significantly different to that can be attributed to power politics.