Nuclear Strategic Assets and Conflict

Nuclear Strategic Assets and Conflict
Historically, States have shown a reluctance to use nuclear weapons in conflict even as a last resort. It is difficult to ascertain if nuclear power actually provides a threat or deterrence to a State engaging in hostile action towards another State. During the Cold War a State’s foreign policy for acquisition of nuclear weapons was associated with deterrence and attraction. Deterrence in that direct conventional military action between the major powers of the United States with its nuclear power allies the United Kingdom and France and the Soviet Union with its nuclear power ally China never occurred. Conflict did occur between smaller States that may have aligned themselves with one of the major powers as with the Vietnam War, Korean War, Pakistan and East Pakistan conflict or the Afghan War.

The conflict with the smaller State’s provided an avenue for the nuclear powered State’s to play out a conventional battle with out nuclear weapons being provoked into use. These nuclear powered States attracted smaller States towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons as they identified with the power of nuclear weapons to deter aggressive action.

After the Cold War, conflict has been isolated. It has not been State based but ethnically, culturally or ideologically based. These isolated conflicts have tended to result in movement across the border placing an economic strain on both the State involved with the conflict and its neighbouring States. Only conventional weapons were used and the absence of nuclear power reactors, research facilities or weapons did not provide targets for opposing hostile forces. If strategic nuclear assets were available within a State that was insecure and unstable the political, social and ecological impact for the State, region or international community would be difficult and undesirable to measure.