European Union's Common Foreign Policy and Security Policy

European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

To what degree is it aided or undermined by policies implemented by the Foreign Ministries of the member States?






European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
To what degree is it aided or undermined by policies implemented by the Foreign Ministries of the member States?



“The Westphalian system included minimal constraints on international behaviour, the permissibility of war as a way of resolving international disputes and the impermissibility of interference in the internal affairs of other states. Harold Nicholson called it French or Old Diplomacy. Francis Fukuyama called it realism.” (refer footnote 1) The European Union has challenged the notion of the Westphalian system by offering states within a regional context supranational institutions to administer their economic, political and social development within the international system. States are able to influence the policy decision-making processes of other states within the Union, which may be viewed as impinging on their national sovereignty. However by seeking membership of the European Union, states are aware of the conditions and regulations that they are to be bound by and are also aware that by being a member they have a say in future regulations, decision making and policy formulation or re-evaluation by consensus to ensure the intent of such outcomes are reflective not only of their national interests but also the common interest of the European Union. Membership also allows smaller states to have further reach and access to more effective national stability mechanisms within the international system by being represented and considered by the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In this respect the intent of the Westphalian system is up held. Foreign Ministries aid the advancement of the European Union CFSP by embracing the institution and providing representation within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Military Committee and if a member representation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both the CFSP construct and NATO share similar functions and resources. The only time the Foreign Ministries undermine the policies of the CFSP is when the Ministers of the Council are unable to reach a consensus on the recommendations for policies put forward by the PSC for implementation or if their national foreign or security policies do not align with that of the European Union CFSP which may detract from the representation provided to them by the European Union. Considering that internal and external threats both have links to external factors that can be represented by the CFSP.

The international system has undergone many changes with the demise of the Soviet Union leading many smaller nation states formally under either the protection of the Soviet Union or the Western Alliance without any real identifiable affiliation to assist with their security issues; whether they be political, economic or physical and represented by internal or external threats. With regards to this paper, it is referenced that the international system moved directly into a multipolar construct even though it can be argued that there was a period of unipolarity with the United States of America playing the leading role within international relations and the international system. In this context these former smaller states, having undergone significant political changes and restructuring were limited in their ability to effectively interact within the international system and without gaining membership to the European Union may have placed a burden not only on themselves but also on the international system by becoming either a weak or failed state. The Helsinki Accords of 1975, partially alleviated the possibility of these smaller states from burdening the regional and international system with regards to security and foreign policy but without integration as offered by ‘the European Union, a system of sovereign states bound in a treaty based regional institution,’ (refer footnote 2) did not allow for forward economical or political advancement. The ‘effective linking of humanitarian issues and transparency of military manoeuvres to security as was intended of the Helsinki Accords did not occur until the revolutions of 1989 which ultimately facilitated the way to further European Union expansion.’(refer footnote 3) The United Nations provided some form of structural guidance however the burden of dealing with state development on a global scale proved to be ineffective without the assistance of a regional forum. For Europe this regional forum has become the European Union. The European Union has had to establish a basis for intergovernmental and supranational integration to meet the needs of the member states and to allow for interaction to be more than just cooperation. Ensuring the survivability of the member states as they moved from operating within a bipolar system to a multipolar system. The foundation work conducted by the member states has allowed the European Union to become a dominate player in the international system especially since it has taken on a multipolar formation. This positioning of the European Union and the development of the CFSP, with member state’s Foreign Ministries through the Council providing a coordinated approach to decision making and policy formulation has allowed for each member state to maintain significant growth within the dynamic and often complex international system. Individual Foreign Ministries are able to formulate their own state foreign policies through their state administrations, as is their sovereign right, and provided that it aids the CFSP, intervention via lobbying by other member states for changes are unlikely to occur and the CFSP is not under minded by such individual action.

Global effects influence the European Union’s CFSP more than domestic policy even though domestic policy in relation to security requires more than an internal focus with the threats posed from within having links to cross border influences. It is these global effects that require the European Union to combine both Foreign and Security under the one legislative decision making process allowing for the number of instruments available to them to be effectively engaged in the international system on a flexible and in a responsive manner. By incorporating representation from the member states within a supranational body its actions are reflective of the common interests, values and issues associated with the member states. Its actions can be slow considering that it can be difficult to gain a consensus between the 25 Member states. The European Union’s CFSP has been tailored to represent the way that the member states want to grow and develop within the requirements associated with the international system. The process for the CFSP’s formulation is reflective of the European idealist respective approach to policy formation and international relations interaction. The process and political architecture has been developed with due regard for the regional impact associated with the demise of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany. The issues dealt with by the policy have reflected the need to deal with regional issues, predominately with regards to Eastern Europe during the 1990’s, even though the impact has been global ‘ensuring that the move towards enlargement to the East did not and does not create destabilising tensions, not least in relations with Russia and Turkey.’ (refer footnote 4) Turkey today is in the process of reform to meet the pre accession requirements in a bid to gain European Union membership. A bid that if proved successful provides an ability for the current worker exchange relationship associated with Germany and Turkey to extend to the wider European Union community. This move to enhance the economic power through enlargement of the European Union does have implications for the political and security aspects associated with the current free movement of European citizens within the borders of the European Union. As highlighted by Didio Bigo, terrorism and organised crime has been associated with ‘immigrants, second generation citizens of foreign origin, people from some inner cities or from the populous and disadvantaged suburbs, resulting in the requirement for the analysis of transversal threats by looking inside the borders in search of an enemy from outside.’ (refer footnote 5) This is especially more pertinent since September 11 and considering the number of borders that are open to free movement of not only citizen but tourists, this is an issue that falls in the realms of the CFSP. The European Union foreign policy has incorporated an extensive foreign aid program to assist with third world development. A program that has been aligned with the United Nations Millennium development goals. Both of these issues mentioned are issues that are constantly dealt with under the guise of foreign and security policy formulation process as a response to the overlapping of internal and external events to the European Union providing accountability and legitimacy to the policies developed for consideration by the Foreign Ministers. Past individual state foreign and security policies that have been considered to impinge or undermine the CFSP have been dealt with by either a combined European Union response or by a response by member states that feel that their combined interests were being undermined by such a detraction from the combined European Union interest. An example is when representatives from Germany, Austria and Holland voted against the provision of funds allocated for illegal immigration administration for Spain at the September 2006 summit held in Finland on the basis that Spain’s PSOE government had adopted legislation in 2005 that encouraged the illegal immigration increase.

The original position of the European Union’s foreign policy can be traced back to the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise where France’s President De Gaulle ‘made it clear that each government not the community institutions should determine how its national interest was to be defined, setting the parameters for De Gaulle’s interpretation of the European ideal.’ (refer footnote 6) France, being a founding member and a member of significant prestige, was a significant player in shaping the structure of the European Union. De Gaulle was opposed to supranational integration as he believed that France’s national interests and maintenance of sovereign rights would not be adequately catered for by the ‘regular majority voting (rather than unanimity among member states), a central, autonomous agency for policy initiation and supervision of implementation (rather than a simple secretariat) and a supreme court (rather than an arbitration tribunal) structures that are associated with supranational integration.’(refer footnote 7) The movement since De Gaulle to supranational institutions for the European Union has raised the issue dealing with the ‘seeming paradox of order, of how it is possible in the face of international anarchy and power politics, do we experience a considerable degree of order and rule compliance in international relations.’ (refer footnote 8) The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was instigated as a response to the fall of the Soviet Union and the resultant possibility for German reunification, going beyond the original economic ideal for integration of creating a common market and providing founding mechanisms for order and rule compliance. “The Maastricht Treaty was founded on five common goals: to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the institutions; improve the effectiveness of the institutions; establish economic monetary union; develop the Community social dimension; and establish a common foreign and security policy pertinent considering that the reasoning for its development was based on external events that would influence not only the individual states but also the European Union as a whole.” (refer footnote 9) This provided good grounding for policy development under the guise of the CFSP to be aided by the member states and their representative Foreign Ministers as common interests identified in each state’s national policies were being considered. This can best be expressed by the term Europeanization. Europeanization of national policy as referred to by both Hill and Smith identifies in their book, International Relations and the European Union, that there are three aspects to Europeanization, convergence as previously discussed, National projection incorporating states ability to project their influence within and outside the Union and Identity reconstruction, where states review definitions to incorporate a unified as well as national perspective.
The underlying aims of the CFSP can be shown to have a direct relationship to the aims of the Council of Europe, considering the membership of the European Union can be identified as a subset of the Council of Europe and both work towards creating treaties that are reflective of the common European interest. The aims of the Council of Europe are expressed by ‘progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy allowing for authoritarian regimes to develop into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. The successive enlargement of the European Union has made a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent by providing a formalised structure of policy formation as opposed to just a mechanism for negotiation and treaty formulation that is representative of both member states and their respective interests.’ (refer footnote 10) States identify that to gain membership and access to the resources and institutions made available requires reform to ensure that they are able to meet the requirements of the common interests represented. Turkey has been an interesting case study. It is a state divided by a desire to join the European Union, the secular Turkish establishment and the nationalist and Islamic movements within Turkey that Identify integration as not being the desired progression for Turkey. Continuing political reform may change Turkey’s domestic situation and with Turkey assuming a more dominate role in the energy transition market ‘it may have more political leverage in EU accession negotiations provided further internal support can be lobbied.’ (refer footnote 11)

‘EU Foreign Policy is reflective of the national foreign policies of the member states, the EC external trade relations and the CFSP. The issues dealt with historically by the state’s foreign policies have been, sometimes in competition and sometimes in cooperation with the EC/EU policies on issues as diverse as dealing with the US, China, Russia, the Middle East, nuclear disarmament, UN reform, and WTO negotiations.’ (refer footnote 12) Considering the membership requirements and gains associated with such membership, state’s Foreign Ministries are able to maintain individual foreign and security policies with out intervention from the European Commission or the European Parliament provided that these policies do not counter the common interests or intent of the CFSP. State’s whose Foreign Ministries incorporate policies that undermine the European Union’s CFSP or do not allow for a consensus with regards to the policy decision making within the European Union administrative structure, considering that the CFSP are formulated with the intent of supporting the common interests of all member states, may receive significant pressure from other member states to re-evaluate such policies. France today under Chirac is defendant of their independent foreign policy and right to such a policy, similar to the realist stance taken by DeGaulle but are proactive in advancing the common interests within the CFSP or working on either a bilateral or multilateral basis to ensure the advancement of the European Union. This is evident on the negotiations conducted by France, Britain and Germany with the Iran situation.

The negotiations that have taken place with regards to Iran’s Nuclear program by the governments of Great Britain, France and Germany on behalf of the European Union provides a good example of how the ministry processes of member states can aid the application or development of the European Union CFSP. These negotiations have gone further than those of 1992 where the European Union adopted a ‘policy of critical dialogue and engagement with Iran to prevent proliferation of missile and nuclear technology from North Korea.’ (refer footnote 13) The negotiation process has continued along the lines of critical engagement and dialogue now adopted by the three states of the European Union but has been assisted by the increase in trade that the European Union has established with the Islamic State, tripling trade between the two over the period 2002-2005. “The German model of using economic leverage focusing on issues such as environmental concerns and open trading rather than military power as the way forward for the EU after the Cold War has led to the European Union being a proactive actor in issues ranging from the UN Human Rights Charter and the NPT, to China’s WTO membership, NATO expansion, and the plight of refugees fleeing wars in Africa, Asia, The Middle East and the Balkans.”(refer footnote 14) This stance however has delayed the development of a purely European infrastructure that could adequately deal with the growing security issues of both internal and external origin. It was not until after the Maastricht Treaty that military realignment and coordination could occur allowing for all states of the European Union to effectively provide for and have a say in the employment of military assets instead of relying on only those states that were members of NATO.


The adoption by the European Union of a CFSP incorporating ‘security and military aspects has allowed for military defence to be included, an aspect that had been ignored by the European Political Cooperation. Previously the military force of the member states that had gained membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have predominately allowed for the defence of their territory and a common nuclear deterrence to rest with NATO and this has been reflected in various state policies. The enlargement program of the European Union highlighted the need for the security of the member states and the requirement for new ‘security structures to allow for cooperation and alliance diplomacy than with a policy aimed at rivalling NATO and US interests, a policy that was perceived as the developing role of the former Western European Union (WEU) construct.’ (refer footnote 15) The PSC represents the European Union when meetings are held with NATO and both provide a coordinated approach to regional and global security that can be called on by either the European Union, NATO, other regional coordinated security bodies as the African Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or internationally by the United Nations. NATO has been predominantly influenced and supported by the United States of America, even though the US is not geographically located in Europe. This arrangement has allowed for progressive and effective response to not only regional conflicts, as with the Balkans but also international conflicts as with Afghanistan, providing further military assistance to the United Nations in trying to maintain an efficient and timely response to crisis management, conflict prevention and management. Crisis Management, conflict prevention and management as well as ensuring that European Union states maintain a certain level of military sophistication and capability is identified as the main responsibility of the European Union CFSP and it is through the efforts of the PSC-NATO dialogue that ensures that the efforts of the CFSP construct and NATO are not duplicated but complimentary. Foreign Ministers whose states are not members of NATO through this dialogue are able to ensure that their domestic foreign and security policies are considered when there is a requirement for decision making in these areas. As the European Union requires states to agree unanimously to decisions being made, it is unlikely that the member states working within the CFSP structure will go any further towards approval for acts of war as was shown by agreement and varied support for the war on Iraq by member states. Only individual member states as opposed to a common united European Union provided support militarily, politically or economically for the war in Iraq. This development by the various Foreign Ministers did not aid or undermine the European Union CFSP but showed that the system was flexible and adaptive to such global issues and decision making requirements. The current war in Afghanistan has shown how a coordinated response from the European Union by utilising the tools and institutions of the CFSP alongside the employment of NATO has given the European Union flexibility and efficiency in deploying to regional areas where internal support mechanisms for such deployments are unable to be catered for locally. The prior coordinated efforts between NATO and the PSC has allowed for a coordinated response to be provided to Afghanistan by the European states. This has insured that the deployment does not become a resource drain on the local economy or causes further conflict or crisis. This flexibility by using a coordinated response by the European Union and NATO due to their membership differences has allowed for more states from Europe to provide assistance in areas of conflict. The Foreign Ministries of member states aided the aims of the CFSP, that if not a member would not have been able to provide such assistance even if they had desired. The construct of the CFSP that has allowed for a coordinated approach in interoperability with regards to security policy formulation, application and consolidation has been as a result of the development of such institutions as the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Union and Security Policy agencies (ISS) and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC). These institutions have distinct roles being either technical, scientific or managerial in nature and assist with the European Unions ability to deal with crisis management; either internal or external, by improving the current and projected future defence capabilities of the member states whilst also maintaining a viable European Union defence industry. This structure and the unique arrangement with both NATO and third parties has ensured that the policies recommended by the PSC are well researched, analysed and articulated to meet the European Union’s foreign and security policy requirements.

‘Referencing the European Union within the theoretical guidelines of international relations, the main problem of using historical notions of Foreign Policy as put forward by scholars of International Relations as Holsti or Allen are highlighted by the European Union’s unique status of being a regional actor where the member states forfeit sovereignty entitlements for membership gains, yet this arrangement is still inline with the intent of the Westphalian system. The European Union has maintained habits of policy consultation and coordination through the EPC since 1970 and is still a flexible and collective yet pluralistic identity that is proactive in its pursuit of Foreign Policy formation as an international actor for the purpose of exerting significant influence on world politics and economic systems.’(refer footnote 16) European Union Foreign and Security policy initiatives have not been restricted to the European continent or region. They have been actively involved in global initiatives by providing funding, technology, knowledge or expertise to assist with the management and implementation of such initiatives, ultimately pursuing a foreign policy of positive engagement. This proactive approach taken by the European Union is to facilitate their CFSP of crisis prevention ensuring that states do not become either regional or global issues, requiring responsive intervention by either state or international institutions. Examples can be traced back to intervention assistance with conflict prevention via negotiation as with the Middle East Peace Process, providing funding and executive expertise to Afghanistan and Iraq and provision of legislation adopting green policies as with the European Union Waste management. It has also allowed individual states on either a bilateral or multilateral basis to pursue European Union interest through negotiation, as has been the case with Iran. Divergence from the CFSP provided does not go against the common interest would be perceivable without interference by either pressure from other member states or internally by constituents that have moved to the member state from another. Individual state Foreign Ministers are aware of this and are more likely to prevent policy formulation or decision-making in the Council by not allowing a consensus, as opposed to developing national policies that are not reflective of the common European interest.

Footnotes

1 Shaun Riorden, The New Diplomacy, Cambridge, 2003, p.31
2 Christopher Hill & Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, 2005, p.155
3 Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein & Richard Langhorne, Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy, London, 2002, p.299
4 Charlotte Bretherton & John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London, 1999, p.139
5 Morten Kelstrup & Michael Williams. International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community, London, 2000, p.171
6 Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin & Ella Ritchie, France in the European Union, Hampshire, 1988, p.25 De Gaulle was quite influential on the European Union initial policy formulation. Policies that were agreed upon during his time were in relation to his desire to ensure that his aim of ensuring that France remains a dominant international player in both leadership and arms trade. At the time arms trade was a lucrative international business for the wealthier Western Bloc countries as well as for Russia. De Gaulle was proactive in his activities with European integration although his efforts were not always successive. As identified by the failure of De Gaulle’s Fouchet Plan.
7 Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin & Ella Ritchie, France in the European Union, Hampshire, 1988, p.22
8 Jorg Freidrichs, 2004. European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A house with many mansions. London, 2004, p.93 Friedrich further elaborated that with regards to European Common Foreign and Security Policy formulation, Kenneth Glarbo identified that if it is referred to social constructivism terms, it easier to identify that the avenue taken by the respective national diplomats has been an increasingly routine multilateral approach towards their fellow diplomats.
9 European Union, Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, Brussels, 2005, P.2
10 Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003, p.1
11 Ariel Cohen & Conway Irwin, Turkey: A Linchpin in Pipeline Politics, more than ever. Washington, 2006, p.8 Both Cohen and Irwin identify that even though Turkey does not have substantial natural gas reserves, within the next five years it is likely to be the main hub for the gas and possibly the oil trade between Russia, Central Asia the Middle East and the European Union. Accession to the European Union would benefit the European Union economically by this role taken on by Turkey but Cohen and Irwin do not elaborate if accession, considering the current political and social attitudes affiliated with Turkey minority groups would affect the stability and cohesion of the European Union. The requirements for accession have been implemented by the European Union to ensure that such attitudes or affiliations can be adequately policed by the state system to ensure the maintenance of stability of the wider regional community within the Union.
12 Christopher Hill & Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, 2005, p.141
13 Rubin Michael, Dangerous Cycle: North Korea, Iran, and repetitive diplomatic failure.
14 Christopher Hill & Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, 2005, p.143-144
15 Mathias Jopp, The Strategic Implications of European Integration, London, 1994, p.68 Mathias highlighted that the enlargement program of the European Union although politically effective means of developing a CFSP construct by allowing the member states a consensus form of policy development was in fact not necessarily the best method for applying security measures with the arrangement at the time between NATO and the WEU. This was elaborated by the two different approaches taken by the members of the European Union with regards to perceived security constructs for the developing Union. One was lead by the British which placed more emphasis on the NATO arrangement and the other was led by France and Germany that identified that the European Union needed a purely European format that would allow for the European Union to continue with contributing to crisis management and practical military cooperation that did not rely on the NATO structure or institutions or rely on NATO for intervention into non Article V missions as the US could not be relied upon for intervening in issues that were not reflective of concern for their national interests. Mathias further elaborated that the WEU in its current construct before the Maastricht Treaty in attempting to include Central and Eastern European states for policy formation was seen as undermining the NATO arrangement as well as developing roles that without the development of supporting infrastructure and institutions would not be able to perform its required functions as the security guarantees provided by NATO were only for NATO membership states as opposed to European Union member states.
16 Christopher Hill & Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, 2005, p.141





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