Nuclear Security the Costs

Nuclear Security

Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on whether you are living in a developed state or a developing state, nuclear technology will be an important component of their domestic and international energy distribution plan. As one of the main uranium suppliers globally, Australia is placed in a very unique situation. It is a growth area that should be taken advantage of to ensure commercial competitiveness but as the potential markets prove to be in environments that can become unstable at anytime, this may be at the individual companies or Australia’s financial detriment. Commercial competition is in direct competition with the assurances of non-proliferation and non-diversion as highlighted by Jose Artur Medeiros, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in a letter to the Director General H.E. Dr Mohammed Elbaradei in 2006. The NSG only provides guidelines to facilitate trade in this industry in accordance with International Nuclear Non Proliferation norms to ensure that such trade does not contribute to proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives. IAEA INFCIRC/254/PART1 & 2 produced by the NSG provides guidelines for the governing of export of items especially designed for nuclear use or can be defined as duel use technology. The important information here is that these are only guidelines that assist individual states to implement necessary domestic controls. As a supplier, Australia is dependent on the recipient state making the necessary agreement with the IAEA and that stability within the State does not change for the duration of the export and handover of the uranium to the recipient state. If stability changes and the recipient State is unable to ensure the physical protection of the nuclear fuel provided, irrespective at stage within the nuclear fuel cycle it becomes both a legal and political issue for the supplying State.

Another problem for Australia and other suppliers of uranium, is that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have the necessary authority to provide an effective audit of all states pursuing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Also the IAEA can be considered as a political as opposed to security tool as it works directly to the United Nations. This is evident by the different approach taken by the United Nations towards India, Pakistan and Israeli, known to have nuclear weapons, but not officially recognised by the Nuclear NPT. These states have been able to continue with nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. The approach taken by the United Nations towards Iran and Iraq has been significantly different considering the political situation associated with the region. The main fear is nuclear war, but it is this author’s opinion that nuclear war is a fallacy; the correct term is nuclear incident and cannot be considered in the same context. Proliferation is not as big an issues as ineffective security, auditing or emergency response procedures. Each of which increase the associated costs if not effectively implemented and political control relinquished.

Yet the environmental security issue that the International Energy Agency is grappling with at this time dictates that Nuclear is a necessary component to meet the growing global demands. According to the United Nations Atomic Chief news release in 2007, Nuclear power is not a panacea for energy supply, but that it helps. He referred to the fact that the latest world energy projections show an increase of 53% in global energy consumption by 2030 if current policies hold and that 70% will be associated with the developing countries. Current projects with wind and solar energy production or cleaning of coal or oil energy production are not sufficient to meet these energy demands at this time alone. The governing document for the IAEA, the nuclear NPT and associated treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotanga, Tlatelolco and Bangkok along with the safeguard obligations are only effective if States are signatories. Something that they can change as political or economic environments become more fluid. Implications for suppliers, is that they maybe required to effect the restitution of the transferred and derived trigger list items on a bilateral level. Costs incurred from this requirement would be bourne by both the recipient and supplying governments and the companies involved. Dependent on the stage the uranium within the nuclear fuel cycle, influences the costs for the restitution. Costs that could be covered by the IAEA if it is effectively empowered outside political control for the growing security role it needs to fulfil. As the problem associated with Nuclear Security is not proliferation but ineffective internal security. This would provide the necessary assurances to the Australian companies involved in the supply of uranium that their trade of this important natural resource and commodity for Australia does not in the long term cause them economical hardship.

The main fear is nuclear war, but it is this author’s opinion that nuclear war is a fallacy; the correct term is nuclear incident and cannot be considered in the same context. Proliferation is not as big an issues as ineffective security, auditing or emergency response procedures. Each of which increase the associated costs if not effectively implemented and political control relinquished.