Nuclear NPT and International Liberalism

Nuclear NPT and International Liberalism
The current nuclear NPT and the associated agreements, treaties and forums that assist with regulating the requirements of the treaty have been effective to date considering that the number of States that have developed a military nuclear program is limited in comparison to the number of States that could have developed such a program. (refer footnote 1) The ability to enforce the treaty considering that some States have been able to acquire a military nuclear program whether signatories or not and that many States have commenced or are considering commencing a civilian nuclear program will be difficult without significant reform or change in intent, accountability and regulation for the State and the individual. (refer footnote 2)

Under reform change, if force were required to be used to secure strategic nuclear assets, it would be done under the control of the IAEA. It would be used to ensure the rights of the individual, intervention through monitoring and adherence to set international regulations assures the rights of the State to manage its right to maintaining sovereignty. The IAEA currently has a regular budget of $275 million to verify that nuclear material and technology is not being diverted to weapon’s programs for State’s currently signatories of the nuclear NPT.(refer footnote 3) For reform change this budget would need significant review.

The assurance provided by such intervention can only be supported by the current revival of international liberalism as the preferred form of political cosmopolitanism. Normative international theory reflected by the idealist legacies of Kant, nineteenth century liberalism and the Wilsonian vision where the world is represented by self-determining peoples whose relations are regulated, on a consensual basis, by international institutions would be the preferred option when considering strategic nuclear assets. (refer footnote 4) Without a revival of international liberalism the current movement towards civilian nuclear programs provide a mechanism for States to pursue military programs. Detection ability by current international detection mechanisms afforded to the IAEA under the nuclear NPT institution are significantly degraded as a State’s or an individuals intentions are masked.

Japan if it desired could develop a nuclear weapon within weeks whilst other State’s just developing civilian nuclear industries could potentially develop a nuclear weapon within months. The ease in which a State can cease to be a member of the NPT as with North Korea or cease to allow the IAEA to continue monitoring the nuclear technology acquisition, research, development and running as with Iraq highlights the ineffectiveness of the current nuclear NPT and associated institutions. (refer footnote 5) North Korea and recently Iran with regards to their uranium enrichment program causing confusion about the intent of their nuclear industry places the organisations managing current institution in a quagmire.

The current construct of the NPT and the associated organisations and agreements encourages a State or non-state actor to pursue nuclear weapons by covert acquisition. The State being either a signatory of the nuclear NPT, not being a signatory or choosing to change their status provides the necessary environment for them to acquire nuclear weapons technology and material by covert means. It is only once a State has acquired the nuclear weapons technology and material that their program becomes overt. International liberalism allows for the international system to be destabilises as States have many avenues to develop and hide their intentions with regards to nuclear weapons acquisitions. Similarly non-State actors can source the nuclear material and technology from a variety of sources and are not constrained or bound by the nuclear NPT.

This pursuit by covert means reduces the ability of the State to allocate effective physical and economical security measures. (refer footnote 6) By hiding their intentions and acquisitions, the physical security allocated to the nuclear weapons is minimal. This increases the threat of sabotage or theft by individuals or non-state actors looking for either short-term materialistic or ideological gains. This has led to the requirement for a form of global governance that recognises a State’s right to implement a military nuclear program to be considered. The international liberal system provided an appropriate architecture and mechanisms for the development and running of the Khan network for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. The Pakistan scientist, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan (refer footnote 7) transferred nuclear military technology from experience and dealings with the Netherlands and North Korea to Iran and Libya.

This proposal of allowing State’s to pursue nuclear weapons may appear radical but it would ensure that States pursuing nuclear weapons technology and registering as Nuclear Weapon State’s are able to do so in a safe and secure environment. There would need to be a sharing of knowledge for safe and secure handling and storing of such weapons. This can only be implemented if the State can provide justification that it can implement the appropriate level of economic and physical security that such a program depends on for its survivability, sustainment and protection. Funding allocations would be consistent with an extensive up front cost that would encompass the purchase, cover storage requirements, implementation of security and safety requirements and the disposal costs attributed to the end of life period for the weapons.

There would also need to be factored into the up front costs, funding to cover environmental testing and cleaning requirements. This would be a necessary preventative measure to cover the costs associated with the use of the weapon whether it is as part of a deliberate attack, which could only be in self-defence or accidental mishandling. Guidance for funding requirements can be taken from the financial assistance that has been provided to Russia for the clearing of nuclear weapons and the transfer of the associated HEU to nuclear fuel banks.

The costs projected for assuring the security and safety of such action is quite significant but negligible in comparison to that required providing for environmental cleaning or containment. To ensure equality between States the amount of extra funding required for the testing and cleaning requirements would need to be based on number and type of weapons held by a State. Funding management would need to be handed over to an international organisation for management as a part of the institutional control mechanism for strategic nuclear assets. A similar financial commitment by each State would be required for the acquisition of strategic nuclear assets for energy generation.

Nuclear weapons themselves are a burden for a State. The security measures that have to be implemented for the research and development, prevention of proliferation, the storing of the weapons themselves as well as the associated defence industries would require significant up front funding to be allocated. Proof that the projected funding can be sustained for the life of the program would also be required to be shown by the State. This idea is not in line with the current intent of the nuclear NPT but is in line with a liberalist approach with managing the issue. It provides an avenue for effective implementation of international liberalism whilst assuring nuclear security.

Footnotes
1 Superseded refers to nuclear power reactors being superseded by more ecologically friendly power sources. Either alternative renewable energy sources and or improved processing techniques to reduce requirements for nuclear fuel waste management and improved cleaning techniques for high levels of radiation. Alternative renewable sources solar power and wind generated turbines.
2 Ramesh Thakur, Answer to Questions. Diplomatic Update 2006 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: Changes and Challenges Conference. Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University 13-14 November 2006.
3 Geoffrey Robertson QC. Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice. 2000. Maryborough. p.189
4 Thomas J. Schroenbaum, International Relations The Path Not Taken: Using International Law to Promote World Peace and Security. 2006. New York. p136
5 Hutchings, Kimberly. 1999. International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era. London: Sage Pub Ltd. p157
6 Robertson QC. op. cit., p.189
7 Applying effective or the required security and economical security measures only has the impact of highlighting the program preventing it from being considered as or maintain its covert nature.
8 Dr Khan is considered as the main actor for Pakistan’s placement as the seventh nuclear state. He gained experience with nuclear technology in the Netherlands from the 1970s and took this experience back to Pakistan in 1976 when he headed up the nuclear program that resulted in successful tests in May 1998. Dr Khan was sacked in 2004 as President Musharraf’s special science and technology advisor and was charged in absence by an Amsterdam court in 1983 for attempted espionage that was later overturned.