Nuclear technology - Policing Policy and Sovereignty

A re-evaluation is a requirement that needs to be seriously considered by the States as the pursuit of environmentally friendly power sources has seen a growth in nuclear technological expertise and knowledge. The United Nations requires transferral of appropriate powers from the States to effectively and efficiently intervene for the settlement and prevention of disputes. They need to develop effective policies, treaties and powers for the IAEA to prevent the misuse of or loss of nuclear technological expertise or knowledge. The probability of a nuclear incident occurring is greatly increased with the current flow towards increased dependence on nuclear for energy. The powers attributed to the IAEA needs international recognition that action can be taken if a State is or is not a signatory of the Nuclear NPT. A nuclear incident does not stop at borders. Their powers only relate to nuclear strategic assets, peaceful and weapons as a form of quality control. They can not take action or report on other matters. The forfeiting of sovereignty for a States nuclear strategic assets assures the State's sovereignty. Refer the sovereignty issue associate with the Panama Canal.

The implementation of effective policies and policing mechanisms, would allow for nuclear weapons to come under the control of the international community, allow for a States prestige in the eyes of the international community and most importantly will prevent nuclear knowledge, material and expertise from being accessed by rogue elements of the international community. States that choose to add nuclear weapons to their armament would be able to maintain their sovereignty rights and with their acknowledged prestige would be able to effectively administer their trade requirements in a transparent manner. The state maintains command and administration. Ensuring that their national interests are met. This is provided that they have proven through effective interstate nuclear diplomacy and application that internal conflict or trans-border conflict by either state or non-state actors has not been driven underground. They need to show that effective negotiation has occurred and form of appeasement reached. The security and safety arrangements implemented by the State would need to reflect this unique situation and prove to be effective against a possible resurgence of such activity.

The desire to add nuclear weapons to a State’s armament would be at a significant financial administrative cost to the State. The prestige, the influence on the balance of power within the international system initially identified as an advancement for the State over time would most likely be identified as an unfavourable position. The financial, resource and moral cost would place the State in an inferior position. This cost would be subject to the financial and resourcing requirements as stipulated by set international standards for acquiring the technology and expertise. The State would also be subjected to the projected ongoing costs for the safe storage, maintenance, audit and disposal of such armaments. This ensures the integrity of the system and the integrity of the security and safety architecture developed and implemented by the IAEA and overseen by the United Nations.

This view is identified as a feasible option to the current international construct for management of nuclear weapons. In relation to the prisoner dilemma theory, this view places the State in an inferior position to if they had not pursued nuclear weapons at all. Both a State identified with or without internal conflict would be required to implement appropriate security and safety measures to ensure that the technology and fissile material is not lost or moved out of State administration.

Historically, States that have pursued nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence for their foreign policy; have been reluctant to actually use them in conflict even as a last resort. Strategic policy usually classifies weapons as first strike or second strike in theory but in practice they have not actually been employed. They have not prevented conventional warfare from occurring, but the thought of a State developing nuclear weapons without international oversight has provoked international intervention. Something that can be avoided with a policy review on the sovereignty of strategic nuclear assets.

Russian/Australian Uranium Deal - Are we sending the right message

Russian Uranium Deal – Are we sending the right message.

Current speculation about whether Australian Labour Government will ratify the Australia-Russia Civil Nuclear Agreement is still high. The agreement signed by both Mr John Howard, former Australian Prime Minister and Mr Vladimir Putin, former Russian President has been an issue of concern for the current Australian government since they were elected to power. The issue outlined for this speculation is the fact that there was an issue in Eastern Europe between Russia and Georgia. This issue did not involve nuclear weapons. It involved minor conflict and the maintaining of a presence within a disputed area. It was not internationally supported but then again entering of Iraq by the United States and coalition forces was not internationally supported. What is Australia’s concern; that uranium maybe directed to military use. The stakeholders that are affected by the ratification or non-ratification are split as to the appropriate outcome. Russia has shown concern for the delay via the Ambassador. This was reported in the Australian Financial Review on the 18 September in John Breusch’s article, ‘Russian Uranium Deal Shaky.’ It is doubtful that it would be supported by the international system for governance of nuclear technology and materials or the international community. Australia decided not to provide uranium to India as it was not a signatory of the NPT. Yet Russia is a signatory of the NPT and has allowed for extensive involvement and investment by the US Government in the destruction and cleanup of their nuclear weapon sites under the Nunn-Lugar program. A program that even US presidential candidate Barrack Obama has been involved as an observer. The process is not completed but is still continuing. Australia signed a similar deal with China and ensured that the appropriate assurances were documented to meet both international requirements and Australian assurances. Similar documentation was staffed for the Russian deal and should be looked at independently to the conflict. The documentation is sound and has been under placed through significant review.

The negative impact on Australia for not accepting the current internationally recognised assurances for nuclear technology, of which Russia is a supporter could cause significant hardship in the future for the companies involved in providing the resource. The ability to negotiate appropriate investment for the resource could be hindered by the fact that after signing such an agreement countries cannot be assured that they will receive delivery of a needed resource within an appropriate time frame. It is recommended that the ratification go ahead to ensure the integrity of the international governance system for nuclear technology. There is more technical information that can be provided for this post, regards to stakeholders, economical impact and govenance system if required.

Nuclear Security the Costs

Nuclear Security

Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on whether you are living in a developed state or a developing state, nuclear technology will be an important component of their domestic and international energy distribution plan. As one of the main uranium suppliers globally, Australia is placed in a very unique situation. It is a growth area that should be taken advantage of to ensure commercial competitiveness but as the potential markets prove to be in environments that can become unstable at anytime, this may be at the individual companies or Australia’s financial detriment. Commercial competition is in direct competition with the assurances of non-proliferation and non-diversion as highlighted by Jose Artur Medeiros, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in a letter to the Director General H.E. Dr Mohammed Elbaradei in 2006. The NSG only provides guidelines to facilitate trade in this industry in accordance with International Nuclear Non Proliferation norms to ensure that such trade does not contribute to proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives. IAEA INFCIRC/254/PART1 & 2 produced by the NSG provides guidelines for the governing of export of items especially designed for nuclear use or can be defined as duel use technology. The important information here is that these are only guidelines that assist individual states to implement necessary domestic controls. As a supplier, Australia is dependent on the recipient state making the necessary agreement with the IAEA and that stability within the State does not change for the duration of the export and handover of the uranium to the recipient state. If stability changes and the recipient State is unable to ensure the physical protection of the nuclear fuel provided, irrespective at stage within the nuclear fuel cycle it becomes both a legal and political issue for the supplying State.

Another problem for Australia and other suppliers of uranium, is that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have the necessary authority to provide an effective audit of all states pursuing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Also the IAEA can be considered as a political as opposed to security tool as it works directly to the United Nations. This is evident by the different approach taken by the United Nations towards India, Pakistan and Israeli, known to have nuclear weapons, but not officially recognised by the Nuclear NPT. These states have been able to continue with nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. The approach taken by the United Nations towards Iran and Iraq has been significantly different considering the political situation associated with the region. The main fear is nuclear war, but it is this author’s opinion that nuclear war is a fallacy; the correct term is nuclear incident and cannot be considered in the same context. Proliferation is not as big an issues as ineffective security, auditing or emergency response procedures. Each of which increase the associated costs if not effectively implemented and political control relinquished.

Yet the environmental security issue that the International Energy Agency is grappling with at this time dictates that Nuclear is a necessary component to meet the growing global demands. According to the United Nations Atomic Chief news release in 2007, Nuclear power is not a panacea for energy supply, but that it helps. He referred to the fact that the latest world energy projections show an increase of 53% in global energy consumption by 2030 if current policies hold and that 70% will be associated with the developing countries. Current projects with wind and solar energy production or cleaning of coal or oil energy production are not sufficient to meet these energy demands at this time alone. The governing document for the IAEA, the nuclear NPT and associated treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotanga, Tlatelolco and Bangkok along with the safeguard obligations are only effective if States are signatories. Something that they can change as political or economic environments become more fluid. Implications for suppliers, is that they maybe required to effect the restitution of the transferred and derived trigger list items on a bilateral level. Costs incurred from this requirement would be bourne by both the recipient and supplying governments and the companies involved. Dependent on the stage the uranium within the nuclear fuel cycle, influences the costs for the restitution. Costs that could be covered by the IAEA if it is effectively empowered outside political control for the growing security role it needs to fulfil. As the problem associated with Nuclear Security is not proliferation but ineffective internal security. This would provide the necessary assurances to the Australian companies involved in the supply of uranium that their trade of this important natural resource and commodity for Australia does not in the long term cause them economical hardship.

The main fear is nuclear war, but it is this author’s opinion that nuclear war is a fallacy; the correct term is nuclear incident and cannot be considered in the same context. Proliferation is not as big an issues as ineffective security, auditing or emergency response procedures. Each of which increase the associated costs if not effectively implemented and political control relinquished.

Concept of Soft Power - Foreign Affairs and Defence

The concept of ‘soft power’ in International Relations.

As State’s that focus on soft power as a key approach in foreign affairs and defence.



Sir Harold Nicholson’s address to the BBC on the eve of the Second World War was optimistic as it stated that ‘in a world in which no single country tried to impose its will by force the system of the balance of power would of course become unnecessary.’ (refer footnote 1) He identified that if there was an absences of the use of hard power which was synonymous with states operating within the international system, that there would no longer be a requirement for referencing balance of power when referring to the international system or international order. This optimistic outlook taken by Sir Nicholson was turned around in 1958 when he conducted an address at Chatham House where he stated ‘ I shall always regard the balance of power as the best method, short of world government or an effective league of nations, of avoiding a major war.’ (refer footnote 2) ‘The major powers did not effectively employ diplomacy ensuring the discerning of objectives that each would accept and providing restraints on their own power, a requirement of such action that is expected in return. As peace can only endure after conflict if all the major players find it preferable to another war.’ (refer footnote 3) With the inability of the League of Nations to prevent the Second World War and the natural tendency of states to assume power over weaker or competing states, stability is questioned resulting in conflict that could only be prevented through application of mechanisms gauging the deterioration of stability. These mechanisms being the balance of power or implementation of internationally recognized institutions, regulations and procedures that deals directly with the states and with the maintenance of stability and security. The balance of power is reflective of stable security, especially within a bipolar international system as was evident post the Second World War with the resultant Cold War. Within a multipolar international system, the system best representing the post Cold War era, the maintenance of stability is difficult to assess and maintain when the balance of power is reflective more of a states pursuit of their national interests as opposed to the pursuit of increase in power. States have pursued their national interests through a combination of both soft and hard power, the use of military and economic support to public diplomacy since the early 1800s.

In this paper, it is intended to identify how states have used soft power as a key approach in foreign affairs and the defence of their state and their national interests. This can only be achieved by defining the concept of soft power, drawing on the comprehensive work conducted by Joseph Nye on the concept of soft power but identifying further that defining a tool of statecraft and diplomacy as either a hard or soft power mechanism is only able to be achieved if it is known the intend behind the use of such a tool. Joseph Nye emphasized public diplomacy, and the advancement of cultural exchanges as being the dominant tools of soft power. I argue that the historically represented hard power tools, the military and the economic might of a state can also if applied correctly and efficiently by the state can be considered as tools of soft power that can in this context be used within the international system for the maintenance of a stable international order and for the advancement of a state’s foreign affairs and defence of its national interests. To effectively show how states have employed soft power since the 1800s it is necessary to consider the international systems that they were operating in and drawing on international relations theory, to place context on the avenues chosen by such states for this employment of soft power their advancement. It is important to note that the use of soft power is not in isolation to the use of hard power as both mechanism complement each other for the advancement of the states national interests within the international system.

The pursuit of national interests sees states pursuing a dynamic approach to interaction within the international system, reflective of an interdependence approach, with many acquiring alliances, allegiances or economic relationships with diverse recipient states as well as appealing to the recipient states with increase knowledge being provided of their culture and values utilizing government institutions, embassies, offering cultural exchanges and encouraging multinational corporations to gain access to foreign markets and consumers. To impose the will or national interest of a state only by force or the use of hard power, a realist approach to international relations, implies military action whether in the form of an act of war or simply increase in arms by a state that could be perceived as a threat to an opposing states security. An example provided by Derek Drinkwater clearly articulates this ‘by referring to the relationship between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. If Germany is sufficiently armed to feel secure, then Great Britain must feel insecure, if France has sufficient war material to feel at ease, then Italy cannot feel at ease.’ (refer footnote 4) To impose will without being perceived as a threat to another state takes more effort, analysis, cooperation and flexibility by a state to ensure that other states do not take intervention that could impede its pursuit of advancing its national interests in such a form that is more reflective of an Idealist approach to international relations. The balance of power as previously articulated by Sir Nicholson would become unnecessary as it would be difficult to measure and would appear fluid in application. A state strong militarily may be weak economically and as such an ineffective player in international relations. Its ability to project its culture and values would be impeded. The state would be unable to impose its will by force without preliminary ground work, negotiations, mediation, development of alliances and allies in a neutral environment, developing financial support, offering either rewards or concessions, identifying weaknesses and strength in relation to their fellow state’s stance in such areas, each of which are mechanisms of soft power alongside the more traditions forms associated with public diplomacy, would be met with maximum obstruction from other states and would unlikely be able to conduct its intended operation.

Power and the way states pursue power is interpreted differently by different states based on their social architecture, ideology, historical and political experiences and their economic stability. Their idea of power and how to gain it is usually reflective of their experiences, knowledge and perceived experience of other states successes. To define power or a tool employed by the state as either hard or soft is quite difficult unless the intent of its use is clearly articulated by the state employing it and it is known what the reflective response of recipient states to this employment of a tool of power is clearly defined. A states power base historically is reflective of its military might; consisting of the military order of battle, the sophistication of its armaments inclusive of quantitative representation of its weapons and ammunition, if it is self reliant or dependent on an ally for the acquisition of current and future armaments, the size of its military inclusive of personnel numbers and their capability which is reflective of their training and experience. Historically, the state’s power base is also reflective of its economic stance within the international system. This is determined by its independent financial status reflective of it being able to meet the needs of its constituents by providing adequate natural resources, food items, technology, social services for internal use and for export to provide sufficient income to ensure that the state is able to advance itself within the international system. The size and location of the state can also influence the power base of the state. A land locked state that has limited access to natural resources with limited transportation systems would have a lower power base than a state that has access to maritime resources and a diverse range of transportation systems. An example would be the comparison of Singapore to Laos with Laos having limited transportation systems and being landlocked does not have the same power stance within the international community as does Singapore, a state that has gained significantly in power within the international system by being a transport hub. The size and nationality of the population also influences the power experienced by the state. If the state has a large population as opposed to a small population, the power is increased. Similarly if stability can be maintained within the state as opposed to a state plagued by internal conflict or secessionist movements, whether they be ideology or religious based is likely to have a higher power base. The pursuit of alliances, allies or alignments along with the pursuit of scientific knowledge and technological innovation held by the state influences the states power base. Which of these conditions is defined as a states hard or soft power depends on how they are actually employed by the state within the international system and what a state perceives as its national interest for advancement within the international system as well as the effect it desires to pursue by the use of this power on the international order. The use of public diplomacy to reference or advance these conditions within the international system assist the condition in being defined as soft power. Soft power as defined by Joseph Nye is attractive power, ‘he defines it being more than just persuasion, influence or the ability to move people by argument. He sees it as the ability to attract, and attraction leads to acquiescence. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction and are not limited to culture or commercial goods.’(refer footnote 5) Military, culture, economics, political and lifestyles is representative of commercial goods for a modern culture, can provide reasons for attractiveness. Soft power and the active pursuit of the use of soft power opens up the form in which a state may wish to advance its national interests providing an attractive asset for inter-state interaction and cooperation. Effective means for the employment of soft power is active pursuit of public diplomacy, transfer of culture, embracing a common language or marketing cultural icons. China has been effective in advancing its national interests by pursuing such soft power. It has marketed itself within Africa by providing ‘aid for state development, aligned itself to values of non interference with African domestic issues and non strings attached financial and technical aid, the Beijing Consensus, and provided scholarships for over 1500 African students, creating enduring bonds between Chinese and African students.’(refer footnote 6)

The military and economic might of the state, which historically were synonymous with hard power and key assets for the defence of the state and its national interests, have been utilized by many states during peacetime for advancement as a tool of soft power alongside public diplomacy by diversifying their function. The success of such use is evinced for the military might by the increase or maintenance of the levels of military expenditures which has not resulted in a global conventional war, increase in inter state military exercises and for the economic might, increase in tourist trade on a global scale and the general adoption of improved standards of living in developing as well as developed countries through either domestic or international initiatives and provision of economic aid. Nye’s reference to soft power and the employment of soft power within world politics can be considered as representative of a constructivists view of international relations where ‘for example, it posits that the reality provided by the use of soft power results in the construction of signs and symbols of a language that socially construct the world through communication and conversation, permits states to reach intersubjective agreements about their contours and dynamics.’ (refer footnote 7) The current war in the Middle East sees the battle being played physically on the ground, the use of military as hard power and a battle within the media, the use of soft power where competing networks representing different national views are portraying different wars for the advancement of state and cultural initiatives. Nye noted that historically ‘military and economic might, were historically associated with hard power as they were used either as inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks) as opposed to attracting opinion or desire to assimilate.’(refer footnote 8) He identified that the ability of the United States to employ film and television to show to the world a culture originally only associated with dreams and desire to many populations was an effective use of soft power but this effect was only able to be achieved by the previous use of their military and economic might, the employment of hard power, which has not been recognized by Nye in his writings. Similarly other states have taken on this medium for transmission of culture, effectively using soft power to advance their causes and national interests both domestically and internationally. An example further to the referenced for the Middle East conflict is India. India has placed considerable investment in their film industry resulting in an increase in attractiveness of the Bollywood films currently being produced for both domestic and international consumption. As highlighted, military today can be a mechanism of either hard power or soft power, dependent on the employment associated by the using state and the appeal demonstrated both domestically and internationally to such an institution. The role of the military has developed significantly since the end of the Cold War where many states have employed the military for both domestic and international humanitarian and natural disaster relief or peacekeeping, increasing the attractiveness for both the state and military, evident by the ever-increasing military strength of states and the diverse roles being pursued for the employment of such services. Developments within military technology being transferred to developments for the civilian sector, sonar technology transferring directly to ultrasound technology used by pregnant mothers, and the military offering an alternative form of employment for states dealing with high unemployment levels has also increased the attractiveness of military services. Constituents can join the military for short periods of time and gain a trade or professional qualification that they can then use within the civilian sector after providing a period of service to the state without providing an economical burden for the period of their training. States that pursue economic aid to advance their national interests abroad as with Japan, the United States, Britain, China and the European Union are also using economic might as a soft power as it not only influences the recipient state but provides an avenue for attractiveness to the moral authority of the donating state. Similarly the provision of military aid post the Iraq war by Japan and European states as apart of state development programs has had the same effect by employing the military as a soft power resource or the provision of military assistance with facilitating peace negotiations for civil unrest, Norway assisting Sri Lanka’s issue with the civil unrest associated with the Tamil Tigers movement for self-determinations is an example of such a provision. In this light soft power is not restricted to cultural tools or mechanisms as discussed by some scholars of international relations.

Within international relations, the concern is not whether the state has hard or soft power but how the state uses its power within the international system to ensure its survivability, advance its national interests without bringing into question the security of another state which is reflective of power being employed as soft as opposed to hard power. A state is able to pursue advancement of its national interests via a soft power approach by encouraging cooperation via mechanisms of public diplomacy, negotiation and diplomacy, either state-to-state, state to international organizations or within the guise of a regional or international organization. It can also be achieved via the advancement of trade with other states that is equitable and in the interest of both states, providing support for the advancement of basic services as with education, supporting or enhancing NGO’s and multinational corporations in being able to provide basic services either domestically or internationally, offering of concessions in one area for advancement in another of mutual interest to more than one state and by providing economic incentives for developments or changes in a states administration that is reflective of recognized international ideals. Along with states pursuing the development of cultural exchanges and development of lasting relationships between societies and states.

In referencing societies, Barry Buzan, Professor of international relations sees society as a system with a form of order. He sees it as a system, sustained by the efforts of states engaging in a form of power play, whether it be hard or soft power play, that pursue functional or contractual relationships reflective of the common interests through the formation of institutions that enforce rules and norms amongst their members limiting the sovereignty of the state and regulating the cultural or social identity. He reiterates that as the international system moves towards a global civil society states begin to function as one with a common cultural bond. There is a movement towards the use of soft power being the more dominant power for foreign affairs and defence, however hard power is maintained by each state. The system moves from the use of hard power to soft power in the form of ‘increased dialogue between states and the consent to common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relation, recognizing their common interests in maintaining these arrangements’(refer footnote 9) is employed by each state to keep the international system developing and ensuring that a stable international order is maintained and the national interests of each state are met within reason. An increase in dialogue can be at either the state level, via military or industry cooperation or the movement of multinational corporations into the international system providing a sense of order which distinguishes a society from that of a mere system. A states application of power within the international system, whether it be hard power or soft power that is chosen, is dependent on whether the system is either a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar system. The maintenance of power in a unipolar system is dependent on maintenance of popular support that can only be achieved through the application of soft power, power of persuasion, negotiation, virtue of collective leaders and appeasement for ethical issues. It is easy to achieve power in the short term but very difficult to maintain for the long term unless mechanisms of soft power are employed and embedded in the international system. Something that ‘Otto Von Bismarch understood and applied for the successful unification of the German Empire in the early 1800s and something that was unable to be achieved by Napoleon Bonaparte in his efforts to establish a long-lived European peace based on French hegemony’ for the same period. “Since the rule of an annexed province calls for strong action and the use of force, something only a conqueror who is massive with arms can sustain, it can never be advisable to acquire dominion over subjects before first having made friends who can contribute to ones power and use methods reflective of current values and norms that can be considered as acceptable.”(refer footnote 10) The United States with its current over stretch associated with its war on terrorism and associated activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan, maintenance of a military presence in both Germany and Korea, military cooperation arrangements with Asia and Europe as well as providing military assistance to domestic and global environmental and humanitarian situations is grappling with the challenges associated with being and maintaining the status of being the only super power. Militarily it maintains this status; economically it is only able to function on the same level as other economically powerful states. Resulting in it relying on public diplomacy to further its foreign affairs and defence and the attractiveness of such foreign affairs and defence. It has been a relatively short period since the end of the Cold War and the establishment of a unipolar system identifying the United States as the only military super power that due to its limited economic power in relation to other powerful economic states is seeing its military super power status and efforts of public diplomacy declining in parallel. A parallel can be made to the 14th and 15th century where the Roman and Florentine Empires, although not world dominating, were considered quite powerful empires in their own right. Referring to the scholarly writings of Plato and Petrarch, both were reflective of a unipolar system where they appealed to the employment of soft power, encouraged virtuous action and deterred wickedness that shaped ethical values. They had ‘appealed to the basic assumption that the political virtues of justice, prudence fortitude, temperance was necessary for the creation of a stable political environment and would ensure that the most vicious of tyrants would yield to this persuasive power of virtue.’(refer footnote 12) The period of time that they were able to maintain Empire status for was reflective of their employment of soft power vice the adherence to the employment of hard power.

The bipolar system, the most stable of the three systems is usually maintained by the employment of hard power and the movement towards sub servant states being played, or playing the super powers for the advancement of national interests within the international system. The Cold War, reflective of a bipolar system maintained stability within the international system for the duration of its existence by sub servant states adopting both hard and soft power mechanisms to pursue their national interests as a counter to the effects of the hard power mechanisms employed by the superpowers. The stability was only challenged during the period by the Cuban crisis, a direct super power to super power employment of hard power mechanisms, and it was only via the employment of soft power, the opening of dialogue that stability could be reestablished and maintained. It was also a period where states, as with Egypt, that were regarded as relatively weak in comparison to the super powers were able to manipulate the system by pursuing a form of soft power to play the super powers against each other advancing its national interests as well as challenging the stability of the international system. Egypt under the leadership of Nasser had achieved major success by playing the super powers, the Soviet Union and the United States against one another during the time of the Aswan Dam Project. Nasser placed a significant amount of analytical thought into the track required to be followed to achieve the desired outcome and had used diplomacy, a form of soft power to negotiate between the two powers for the best possible solution for Egypt’s national interests. This was done to ensure that the financing acquired for the project did not result in a dependency relationship associated with large foreign investment of such development projects restricting the overall influence able to be utilized by such powers. Nasser identified that the longer his reaction stands the more difficult to reverse it, especially by the use of force, hard power, by Great Britain, France and the United States. Hard Power was used as a result of Nasser nationalizing the Suez Canal, a retaliation action pursued by Nasser to the United States withdrawing from financial obligations for the Dam project and leaving the only support available to be from Russia stepping into provides the necessary financing. ‘War resulted with Great Britain, France and Israel forces moving against Egypt, a reaction that was condemned by the United States, influenced by Russia vetoing the agreements made through negotiation to pass through the Security Council as well as increasing the provision of arms to the Middle East. This hostility was later removed by actions taken by the United Nations.’ (refer footnote 13) Nasser’s use of soft power, notably time and diplomacy in an attempt to prevent further influence being open to external powers on his state resulted in the short term in war but in the long term removed the potential for a dependency relationship developing with a super power. He managed to maintain autonomy and scope for further negotiation with either Powers. It did however identify that such actions would elicit different responses from the superpowers, placing Egypt in good stead for future negotiations with such powers. ‘It highlighted that applying pressure to the United States generally elicited protestations of good faith and efforts to alleviate the stated grievances, where as applying pressure to the Soviet Union could be risky and resulted in counter pressure.’ (refer footnote 14)

The decline in the United States status as the only super power has seen the rise in the employment of mechanisms of soft and hard power utilized by othr states resulting in a movement towards a multipolar system with Russia, the European Union, Britain, China, and India establishing dominant roles alongside the United States within the international system for the maintenance of a stable international order. The multipolar system, a system where by stability of the international system is maintained through the use of both hard and soft power through a degree of interdependence relationships between states, institutions and corporations. The states actively pursuing a common interest for their national interests via state-to-state interaction or via international organizations, which in joining can be considered as the pursuit of soft power is reflective of state and constituent interaction and the power that can be exerted by the people which are influenced by the wider global society. This pursuit, although considering domestic influence is to maintain legitimacy and support with their constituents ensuring internal stability and the fostering of stable foreign relationships and defence of the state public institution that is the governing body. ‘Reflective of personal political survival of domestic politics rather than the survival of the state within the international system, considering the democracy and interdependence nature of the international world, domestic politics have the potential to be played out on the international stage affecting the defence of the state from external influences and the stability of the international system.’ (refer footnote 15) For Cuba the application of soft power in international affairs to have an economic war, mechanism of hard power, reevaluated proved to be successful. Cuba, even though plagued by a US economic war and resultant blockade inclusive of food and medicine items was able in 2000 to exert in the form of soft power pressure to have the blockade reexamined by granting 500 scholarships annually to young Americans from low-income families to study medicine free of charge in Cuba. The scholarships were aimed at minority groups within the United States, Afro-Americans and Latinos that faced hardships in living conditions, reflective of third world countries. The scholarships were offered worldwide with recipients being from the United States and coming from many third world states reaching as far as Africa. This placed a moral dilemma on the United States administration that could not be fought via the employment of hard or soft power mechanisms, resulting in the easing of trade sanctions in the area of food and medicine for Cuba. A mechanism of Hard Power that had been in place for a considerable time by the United States was reevaluated by the pursuit and employment of a mechanism of soft power by Cuba that influenced the opinions of societies within the United States. The cooperation provided through the provision of scholarships for the training of doctors to those that could not necessarily have afforded it or received indigenous state funds for the provision of such training proved to be a valuable and successful form of public diplomacy for Cuba.

Many post modernist scholars of international relations have reiterated the identification of domestic politics taking on an international presence and becoming a major factor in international relations and the need of state leaders to employ soft power and public diplomacy within a national context to ensure survivability and as a counter to the soft power generated within the society that is based on values, culture and ideology. Donald Puchala identified that ‘in the post Cold War world of international politics, the international system would be influenced by states reacting to domestically generated events abroad amplified and echoed via networks of interdependence, and states reacting to social, economic, demographic and physical movements where international relations, particularly in political mode are still about values. The values in question being identity, justice, equity, autonomy, security and more, usually embedded in ideologies and acted upon by protectors and projectors.’ (refer footnote 16) The provision of medical training to the under privileged United States constituents, provided grounds for a domestic issue; education, to be used within an international contexts for Cuba to gain support and make advances in its international affairs.

Soft Power in international relations has been employed by states regularly for the maintenance of a stable international order, a balance of power in approaching their foreign affairs relations and maintaining defense of their national interest. Germany, Japan, Egypt and Cuba are four states that have during history focused on the use of soft power to advance their state and the states national interests. America, France and Britain known for their employment of soft power, attractive power, in foreign policy over the years, especially since the end of the Cold War, has seen many changes in the balance of power within international relations. The international system itself is a mechanism of soft power for societies and populations to wield power, soft power to induce change either domestically or internationally. ‘As states develop, their societies go through a transformation, move from being traditional agrarian societies to middle-class industrial societies that influence political transformations, usually the degeneration of traditional authoritarian regimes to be replaced by a democratic system. The international system that facilitated social transformation and economic development provided the basis of soft power, people power that was able to transform the political institution of a state. A form of soft power that can only be countered by a state employing effectively and efficiently in a timely manner soft power to prevent such action as opposed to hard power that would only delay such a transformation.’(refer footnote 17) The United States has been able to ‘shape the desires of other cultures based on the attractiveness of their own culture and values and by being able to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preference because they seem to be too unrealistic.’ (refer footnote 18) Germany post World War II and the movement towards civilian power as opposed to military advancement was reflective of United States and European foreign policy being easily accepted by a population that was still feeling the effects of the wartime suffering. For West Germany this was most notable during the post war period where civilian power was at the forefront of their foreign policy agenda. ‘Its particular form of foreign policy identity, or role of concept promoted multilateralism, institution building and supranational integration and tried to constrain the use of force in international relations through national and international norms. This strategy taken by West Germany contributed enormously to the dynamic stability of an international order economically, politically and thru its security policies which have only recently been adapted to reflect the international norms placed on states post the September 11 terrorist attacks.’ (refer footnote 19) The civilian power status attributed to Germany was the result of circumstances, the emergence of cooperation, identification that economic advancement was more important than the development of power and that integration instead of autonomy, forfeiting aspects of sovereignty would provide a better platform for a reemergence within the international system and assist with pursuing national interests whilst still maintaining a stable international order. This was a significant change for Germany, to be flexing soft power as opposed to hard power, reflective of the idealist approach to foreign policy development as opposed to the traditional realist approach of its prewar realpolitik days where pursuit of power via conflict or competition as opposed to cooperation equaled the pursuit of its national interests. ‘The preference for Germany became political compromise over military force and cooperation over coercion.’(refer footnote 20)

Similar to Germany, Japan has been characterized as a civilian power that has pursued avenues other than military force to advance its national interests within the international system. It has an extensive Official Development Assistance (ODA) program, providing assistance to many Asian states along with extensive economic and technical cooperation programs. The ODA program is ‘on of the most valuable instruments to Japan’s foreign policy, helping to compensate for Japan’s limited direct-security contributions. From 1991 – 2000 Japan was the largest aid donor globally to developing countries.’(refer footnote 21) Japan has a strong and technically advanced Self Defence Force that is considered as a soft power as it is function is only for defence but is supported by the United States Defence Force through bilateral arrangements that is a hard power. Its ‘security policy since WWII has constrained this policy to be reflective of anti-military political culture determining nature to security and foreign policy. Alternative to Germany, it has been slow to redefine its role in international security due to its political culture of constitutional pacifism, the limited number of multilateral institutions in Asia for Japan to participate in and an inability to overcome the burden to history based on bitter colonial experiences.’ (refer footnote 22) ‘Japan is the largest source of ODA to South Asia and continues to increase as other sources of ODA for the region are shrinking or being diverted to other areas, such as Eastern Europe, guaranteeing for Japan an avenue for foreign policy projection, cultural exchanges, economic cooperation and advancement of its national interest within a region dominated by developing states.’ (refer footnote 23)


The application of power whether it be soft or hard power, within international relations is subject to legitimacy. Legitimacy within the international political order can only be owned by a sovereign state exercising its right to self-determination. Legitimacy cannot be transposed to multinational corporations or Non Government Organisation, although these institutions may be seen as influential to state decision-making due to their own economic power and power within civil society. ‘Legitimacy can transform a simple exercise of power into a system of authority. Compliance to a state’s power can be secured in the absence of legitimacy but only at a price. The structure of power is a complex mix of strategic bipolarity (today strategic multipolarity), nuclear multipolarity and political and economic diffusion of power and influence.’ (refer footnote 24) The establishment of the MFO in the Sinai was legitimized by the fact that it was an international force, consisting of United States, Egypt and Israeli forces supported by members of the UN exercising their soft power, even though its establishment was not UN sanctioned. Within the political and economic diffusion of power and influence are mechanisms employed under the guise of soft power that have hard power backing being the political and associated military institutions themselves and the economic might of the state or the power associated with an allied state. Japan, noted as a state that employs soft power in international relations through its ODA and cultural exchange programs and the maintenance of a Self Defence Force that is not employed in conventional warfare or peacekeeping operations has the backing of its ally the United States that is known for employing both hard and soft power within the international system for the advancement of its national interests and maintenance of a stable international order. Soft power mechanisms are difficult to define and are case dependent as to whether they are to be defined as either soft or hard power. The desired and perceived effects of how they are employed determine how such mechanisms are defined. Within the international system ‘authority and power are used to distinguish each other in the exercise of influence.’(refer footnote 25) Historically states and later the formation of state based international organizations have had the authority and power to influence decisions made or actions taken within other states. Today with globalization, the movement of multinational corporations into influential positions, decisions being made or actions taken by states have been influenced by a complex web of international actors that although had the power to influence did not necessarily have the authority. These actors are not considered by states as key mechanisms for official deployment in matters relating to foreign affairs and the defence of the state but are only considered as supporting mechanisms to state diplomacy and actions within the international system for the maintenance of international order. The affects of such decision making, emphasis on the use of tools; military, political, economical and cultural, available to the state being used as soft power mechanisms as a key approach in foreign affairs and defence has changed the balance of the international system providing different avenues for states to pursue their national interests and has called for the redefining of the state administrative system ensuring that a state’s sovereignty and ultimately a stable international order can be induced and maintained ensuring that a non violent solution is reached as an alternative to conflict.

Footnotes

1 Derek Drinkwater, 2005. Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist. Oxford univ Press, Oxford. p. 76.
2 Drinkwater, loc. cit.
3 Frederick Kagan, 2005. Power and Persuasion. Wilson Quarterly,29 (3), p. 57.
4 Drinkwater, loc. cit.
5 Joseph Nye. 2004. Soft Power: The means to success in World Politics. Public Affairs, New York. p.6.
6 Drew Thompson, 2005. China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the ‘Beijing Consensus’ to Health Diplomacy, Asia Media: Media News Today.
7 Donald Puchala. 2004. Theory and History in International Relations. Routledge, New York. p. 220.
8 Nye, 2004. Op. cit., p. 8.
9 Barry Buzan, 2004. From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge. p. 37.
10 Frederick Kagan identified that both diplomats were quite skilful with the art of employing public diplomacy, stating that Bismarch understood the principles of Diplomacy better than any other statesman of modern times. He identified that Bonaparte’s failings could be attributed to being unable to define a goal for himself that the rest of Europe would find acceptable and using aggressive tactics that were not reflective of European values.
11 Mikael Hornqvist, 2004. Machiavelli and Empire. Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge. p. 135.
12 ibid., p. 20.
13 Henry Kissenger. 1994. Diplomacy. 1994. Touchstone, New York. p.531.
14 ibid., p. 546.
15 Robert Jackson. 1990. Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge Univ Press, Melksham. p. 167.
16 Puchala, op. cit., p. 216.
17 ibid., p. 198.
18 Nye, op. cit., p.7.
19 Saori Katada, W Hanns & Takashi Inoguchi. 2004. Global Governance: Germany and Japan in the International System. Ashgate Pub Ltd, England. p. 89.
20 Katada, Maull & Inoguchi. op. cit.
21 Charles Morrison. 2003. Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2003. Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo. p. 86.
22 Katada, Maull & Inoguchi. op. cit., p. 112.
23 S. P. Gupta, Seizabro Sato & R. L. Chawla. 1994. Cooperation for Growth: Perspective on Japan-South Asia Relations. Macmillan India Ltd, Bangalore. p. 105.
24 Ramesh Thakur. 1987. International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force. Westview Press Inc, Boulder. p. 145.
25 ibid., p. 148.


Bibliography


Armstrong, David. Lloyd, Lorna & Redmond, John. From Versailles to Maastricht: International Organisation in the Twentieth Century. Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd.

Armstrong, David, Lloyd, Lorna & Redmond, John. [1982]2004. International Organisation in World Politics 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bobbio, Norberto. 1989. Democracy and Dictatorship: The nature and limits of State Power. Trans Peter Kennealy. Minneapolis: Univ of Minnesota Press.

Brown, Michael. Lynn-Jones, Sean. & Miller, Steven E. 1995. The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security. London: The Mit Press.

Buzan, Barry. 2004. From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press.

Chapin, Peter. 2006. Soft Power and Public Diplomacy. Japan Foundation center for Global Partnership, Japan. [Online]. Available: http://www.cgp.org/popups/articleswindow.php?articleid=314. [2006, August 06]

Daniel, Kate. 2005. SBS World Guide: The complete fact file on every country. 13th Ed. Melbourne: Hardie Grant Books.

Drinkwater, Derek. 2005. Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist. Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.

Frederick, Kagan. W. 2005. Power and Persuasion. Wilson Quarterly. Summer 2005, Vol29 Issue3, 57-65. [Online]. Available: http://web6.epnet.com [2006, July 31].

Freedman, Lawrence. [1998] 2003. Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases. Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.

Gupta, S. P., Sato, Seizabro. & Chawla, R.L. 1994. Cooperation for Growth: Perspective on Japan – South Asia Relations. Bangalore: Macmillan India Ltd.

Heraclides, Alexis. 1991. The Self determination of Minorities in International Politics. London: Frank Cass.

Holsti, K.J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional change in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press.

Hornqvist, Mikael. 2004. Machiavelli and Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press.

Isakovic, Zlatko. 2000. Introduction to a Theory of Political Power in International Relations. England: Ashgate Publishing

Jackson, Robert. H. 2000. The Global Covenant. Human conduct in a World of States. Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.

Jackson, Robert, H. 1990. Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International relations and the Third World. Melksham: Cambridge Univ Press.

Johnsson, Christer & Hall, Martin. 2005. Essence of Diplomacy. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Katada, Saori N, Maull, Hanns W and Inoguchi, Takashi. 2004. Global Governance: Germany and Japan in the International System. England: Ashgate Pub Ltd.

Kegley, Charles Jr, and Eugene Wittkopf. World Politics: Trends and Transformation. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.

Kegley, Charles Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond. 2002 Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Kissenger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Touchstone.

Mansbach, Richard W. & Rhodes, Edward J. 2003, Global Politics in a changing World. 2nd Ed.Boston: Mifflin.

Moon, Jeremy, and Bruce Stone. 2002. Power and Freedom in Modern Politics. Crawley: Univ of Western Australia Press.

Morgenthau, Hans. & Thompson, Kenneth W. [1948] 1985. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 6th Ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Morland, Dave. & Cowling, Mark. 2004. Political Issues for the Twenty-First Century. Hants: Ashgate Pub Ltd.

Morrison, Charles E. 2003. Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2003. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange.

Nye, Joseph S. JR. 2004. Soft Power: The means to success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.

Pollard, Vincent. K. 2004. Globalisation, Democratisation and Asian Leadership: Power Sharing, Foreign Policy and Asian Leadership. Hants: Ashgate Pub Ltd.

Puchala, Donald. J. 2003. Theory & History in International Relations. New York: Routledge.

Shepard, Paul. 2000, June 4. Castro offers free medical training for US students from poor areas. Independent.[online]. Availability: http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/060400-01.htm/ [2006, May 29].

Thakur, Ramesh. 1987. International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United nations Authority and Multinational Force. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc.

Thompson, Drew. 2005, October 13. China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the Beijing Consensus to Health Diplomacy. Asia Media: Media News Daily. [Online]. Available: http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=32003.

Vital, David. 1967. The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations. London: Oxford Univ Press.

Watson, Adam. [1982]1984. Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States. London: Routledge.

European Union's Common Foreign Policy and Security Policy

European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

To what degree is it aided or undermined by policies implemented by the Foreign Ministries of the member States?






European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
To what degree is it aided or undermined by policies implemented by the Foreign Ministries of the member States?



“The Westphalian system included minimal constraints on international behaviour, the permissibility of war as a way of resolving international disputes and the impermissibility of interference in the internal affairs of other states. Harold Nicholson called it French or Old Diplomacy. Francis Fukuyama called it realism.” (refer footnote 1) The European Union has challenged the notion of the Westphalian system by offering states within a regional context supranational institutions to administer their economic, political and social development within the international system. States are able to influence the policy decision-making processes of other states within the Union, which may be viewed as impinging on their national sovereignty. However by seeking membership of the European Union, states are aware of the conditions and regulations that they are to be bound by and are also aware that by being a member they have a say in future regulations, decision making and policy formulation or re-evaluation by consensus to ensure the intent of such outcomes are reflective not only of their national interests but also the common interest of the European Union. Membership also allows smaller states to have further reach and access to more effective national stability mechanisms within the international system by being represented and considered by the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In this respect the intent of the Westphalian system is up held. Foreign Ministries aid the advancement of the European Union CFSP by embracing the institution and providing representation within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Military Committee and if a member representation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both the CFSP construct and NATO share similar functions and resources. The only time the Foreign Ministries undermine the policies of the CFSP is when the Ministers of the Council are unable to reach a consensus on the recommendations for policies put forward by the PSC for implementation or if their national foreign or security policies do not align with that of the European Union CFSP which may detract from the representation provided to them by the European Union. Considering that internal and external threats both have links to external factors that can be represented by the CFSP.

The international system has undergone many changes with the demise of the Soviet Union leading many smaller nation states formally under either the protection of the Soviet Union or the Western Alliance without any real identifiable affiliation to assist with their security issues; whether they be political, economic or physical and represented by internal or external threats. With regards to this paper, it is referenced that the international system moved directly into a multipolar construct even though it can be argued that there was a period of unipolarity with the United States of America playing the leading role within international relations and the international system. In this context these former smaller states, having undergone significant political changes and restructuring were limited in their ability to effectively interact within the international system and without gaining membership to the European Union may have placed a burden not only on themselves but also on the international system by becoming either a weak or failed state. The Helsinki Accords of 1975, partially alleviated the possibility of these smaller states from burdening the regional and international system with regards to security and foreign policy but without integration as offered by ‘the European Union, a system of sovereign states bound in a treaty based regional institution,’ (refer footnote 2) did not allow for forward economical or political advancement. The ‘effective linking of humanitarian issues and transparency of military manoeuvres to security as was intended of the Helsinki Accords did not occur until the revolutions of 1989 which ultimately facilitated the way to further European Union expansion.’(refer footnote 3) The United Nations provided some form of structural guidance however the burden of dealing with state development on a global scale proved to be ineffective without the assistance of a regional forum. For Europe this regional forum has become the European Union. The European Union has had to establish a basis for intergovernmental and supranational integration to meet the needs of the member states and to allow for interaction to be more than just cooperation. Ensuring the survivability of the member states as they moved from operating within a bipolar system to a multipolar system. The foundation work conducted by the member states has allowed the European Union to become a dominate player in the international system especially since it has taken on a multipolar formation. This positioning of the European Union and the development of the CFSP, with member state’s Foreign Ministries through the Council providing a coordinated approach to decision making and policy formulation has allowed for each member state to maintain significant growth within the dynamic and often complex international system. Individual Foreign Ministries are able to formulate their own state foreign policies through their state administrations, as is their sovereign right, and provided that it aids the CFSP, intervention via lobbying by other member states for changes are unlikely to occur and the CFSP is not under minded by such individual action.

Global effects influence the European Union’s CFSP more than domestic policy even though domestic policy in relation to security requires more than an internal focus with the threats posed from within having links to cross border influences. It is these global effects that require the European Union to combine both Foreign and Security under the one legislative decision making process allowing for the number of instruments available to them to be effectively engaged in the international system on a flexible and in a responsive manner. By incorporating representation from the member states within a supranational body its actions are reflective of the common interests, values and issues associated with the member states. Its actions can be slow considering that it can be difficult to gain a consensus between the 25 Member states. The European Union’s CFSP has been tailored to represent the way that the member states want to grow and develop within the requirements associated with the international system. The process for the CFSP’s formulation is reflective of the European idealist respective approach to policy formation and international relations interaction. The process and political architecture has been developed with due regard for the regional impact associated with the demise of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany. The issues dealt with by the policy have reflected the need to deal with regional issues, predominately with regards to Eastern Europe during the 1990’s, even though the impact has been global ‘ensuring that the move towards enlargement to the East did not and does not create destabilising tensions, not least in relations with Russia and Turkey.’ (refer footnote 4) Turkey today is in the process of reform to meet the pre accession requirements in a bid to gain European Union membership. A bid that if proved successful provides an ability for the current worker exchange relationship associated with Germany and Turkey to extend to the wider European Union community. This move to enhance the economic power through enlargement of the European Union does have implications for the political and security aspects associated with the current free movement of European citizens within the borders of the European Union. As highlighted by Didio Bigo, terrorism and organised crime has been associated with ‘immigrants, second generation citizens of foreign origin, people from some inner cities or from the populous and disadvantaged suburbs, resulting in the requirement for the analysis of transversal threats by looking inside the borders in search of an enemy from outside.’ (refer footnote 5) This is especially more pertinent since September 11 and considering the number of borders that are open to free movement of not only citizen but tourists, this is an issue that falls in the realms of the CFSP. The European Union foreign policy has incorporated an extensive foreign aid program to assist with third world development. A program that has been aligned with the United Nations Millennium development goals. Both of these issues mentioned are issues that are constantly dealt with under the guise of foreign and security policy formulation process as a response to the overlapping of internal and external events to the European Union providing accountability and legitimacy to the policies developed for consideration by the Foreign Ministers. Past individual state foreign and security policies that have been considered to impinge or undermine the CFSP have been dealt with by either a combined European Union response or by a response by member states that feel that their combined interests were being undermined by such a detraction from the combined European Union interest. An example is when representatives from Germany, Austria and Holland voted against the provision of funds allocated for illegal immigration administration for Spain at the September 2006 summit held in Finland on the basis that Spain’s PSOE government had adopted legislation in 2005 that encouraged the illegal immigration increase.

The original position of the European Union’s foreign policy can be traced back to the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise where France’s President De Gaulle ‘made it clear that each government not the community institutions should determine how its national interest was to be defined, setting the parameters for De Gaulle’s interpretation of the European ideal.’ (refer footnote 6) France, being a founding member and a member of significant prestige, was a significant player in shaping the structure of the European Union. De Gaulle was opposed to supranational integration as he believed that France’s national interests and maintenance of sovereign rights would not be adequately catered for by the ‘regular majority voting (rather than unanimity among member states), a central, autonomous agency for policy initiation and supervision of implementation (rather than a simple secretariat) and a supreme court (rather than an arbitration tribunal) structures that are associated with supranational integration.’(refer footnote 7) The movement since De Gaulle to supranational institutions for the European Union has raised the issue dealing with the ‘seeming paradox of order, of how it is possible in the face of international anarchy and power politics, do we experience a considerable degree of order and rule compliance in international relations.’ (refer footnote 8) The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was instigated as a response to the fall of the Soviet Union and the resultant possibility for German reunification, going beyond the original economic ideal for integration of creating a common market and providing founding mechanisms for order and rule compliance. “The Maastricht Treaty was founded on five common goals: to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the institutions; improve the effectiveness of the institutions; establish economic monetary union; develop the Community social dimension; and establish a common foreign and security policy pertinent considering that the reasoning for its development was based on external events that would influence not only the individual states but also the European Union as a whole.” (refer footnote 9) This provided good grounding for policy development under the guise of the CFSP to be aided by the member states and their representative Foreign Ministers as common interests identified in each state’s national policies were being considered. This can best be expressed by the term Europeanization. Europeanization of national policy as referred to by both Hill and Smith identifies in their book, International Relations and the European Union, that there are three aspects to Europeanization, convergence as previously discussed, National projection incorporating states ability to project their influence within and outside the Union and Identity reconstruction, where states review definitions to incorporate a unified as well as national perspective.
The underlying aims of the CFSP can be shown to have a direct relationship to the aims of the Council of Europe, considering the membership of the European Union can be identified as a subset of the Council of Europe and both work towards creating treaties that are reflective of the common European interest. The aims of the Council of Europe are expressed by ‘progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy allowing for authoritarian regimes to develop into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. The successive enlargement of the European Union has made a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent by providing a formalised structure of policy formation as opposed to just a mechanism for negotiation and treaty formulation that is representative of both member states and their respective interests.’ (refer footnote 10) States identify that to gain membership and access to the resources and institutions made available requires reform to ensure that they are able to meet the requirements of the common interests represented. Turkey has been an interesting case study. It is a state divided by a desire to join the European Union, the secular Turkish establishment and the nationalist and Islamic movements within Turkey that Identify integration as not being the desired progression for Turkey. Continuing political reform may change Turkey’s domestic situation and with Turkey assuming a more dominate role in the energy transition market ‘it may have more political leverage in EU accession negotiations provided further internal support can be lobbied.’ (refer footnote 11)

‘EU Foreign Policy is reflective of the national foreign policies of the member states, the EC external trade relations and the CFSP. The issues dealt with historically by the state’s foreign policies have been, sometimes in competition and sometimes in cooperation with the EC/EU policies on issues as diverse as dealing with the US, China, Russia, the Middle East, nuclear disarmament, UN reform, and WTO negotiations.’ (refer footnote 12) Considering the membership requirements and gains associated with such membership, state’s Foreign Ministries are able to maintain individual foreign and security policies with out intervention from the European Commission or the European Parliament provided that these policies do not counter the common interests or intent of the CFSP. State’s whose Foreign Ministries incorporate policies that undermine the European Union’s CFSP or do not allow for a consensus with regards to the policy decision making within the European Union administrative structure, considering that the CFSP are formulated with the intent of supporting the common interests of all member states, may receive significant pressure from other member states to re-evaluate such policies. France today under Chirac is defendant of their independent foreign policy and right to such a policy, similar to the realist stance taken by DeGaulle but are proactive in advancing the common interests within the CFSP or working on either a bilateral or multilateral basis to ensure the advancement of the European Union. This is evident on the negotiations conducted by France, Britain and Germany with the Iran situation.

The negotiations that have taken place with regards to Iran’s Nuclear program by the governments of Great Britain, France and Germany on behalf of the European Union provides a good example of how the ministry processes of member states can aid the application or development of the European Union CFSP. These negotiations have gone further than those of 1992 where the European Union adopted a ‘policy of critical dialogue and engagement with Iran to prevent proliferation of missile and nuclear technology from North Korea.’ (refer footnote 13) The negotiation process has continued along the lines of critical engagement and dialogue now adopted by the three states of the European Union but has been assisted by the increase in trade that the European Union has established with the Islamic State, tripling trade between the two over the period 2002-2005. “The German model of using economic leverage focusing on issues such as environmental concerns and open trading rather than military power as the way forward for the EU after the Cold War has led to the European Union being a proactive actor in issues ranging from the UN Human Rights Charter and the NPT, to China’s WTO membership, NATO expansion, and the plight of refugees fleeing wars in Africa, Asia, The Middle East and the Balkans.”(refer footnote 14) This stance however has delayed the development of a purely European infrastructure that could adequately deal with the growing security issues of both internal and external origin. It was not until after the Maastricht Treaty that military realignment and coordination could occur allowing for all states of the European Union to effectively provide for and have a say in the employment of military assets instead of relying on only those states that were members of NATO.


The adoption by the European Union of a CFSP incorporating ‘security and military aspects has allowed for military defence to be included, an aspect that had been ignored by the European Political Cooperation. Previously the military force of the member states that had gained membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have predominately allowed for the defence of their territory and a common nuclear deterrence to rest with NATO and this has been reflected in various state policies. The enlargement program of the European Union highlighted the need for the security of the member states and the requirement for new ‘security structures to allow for cooperation and alliance diplomacy than with a policy aimed at rivalling NATO and US interests, a policy that was perceived as the developing role of the former Western European Union (WEU) construct.’ (refer footnote 15) The PSC represents the European Union when meetings are held with NATO and both provide a coordinated approach to regional and global security that can be called on by either the European Union, NATO, other regional coordinated security bodies as the African Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or internationally by the United Nations. NATO has been predominantly influenced and supported by the United States of America, even though the US is not geographically located in Europe. This arrangement has allowed for progressive and effective response to not only regional conflicts, as with the Balkans but also international conflicts as with Afghanistan, providing further military assistance to the United Nations in trying to maintain an efficient and timely response to crisis management, conflict prevention and management. Crisis Management, conflict prevention and management as well as ensuring that European Union states maintain a certain level of military sophistication and capability is identified as the main responsibility of the European Union CFSP and it is through the efforts of the PSC-NATO dialogue that ensures that the efforts of the CFSP construct and NATO are not duplicated but complimentary. Foreign Ministers whose states are not members of NATO through this dialogue are able to ensure that their domestic foreign and security policies are considered when there is a requirement for decision making in these areas. As the European Union requires states to agree unanimously to decisions being made, it is unlikely that the member states working within the CFSP structure will go any further towards approval for acts of war as was shown by agreement and varied support for the war on Iraq by member states. Only individual member states as opposed to a common united European Union provided support militarily, politically or economically for the war in Iraq. This development by the various Foreign Ministers did not aid or undermine the European Union CFSP but showed that the system was flexible and adaptive to such global issues and decision making requirements. The current war in Afghanistan has shown how a coordinated response from the European Union by utilising the tools and institutions of the CFSP alongside the employment of NATO has given the European Union flexibility and efficiency in deploying to regional areas where internal support mechanisms for such deployments are unable to be catered for locally. The prior coordinated efforts between NATO and the PSC has allowed for a coordinated response to be provided to Afghanistan by the European states. This has insured that the deployment does not become a resource drain on the local economy or causes further conflict or crisis. This flexibility by using a coordinated response by the European Union and NATO due to their membership differences has allowed for more states from Europe to provide assistance in areas of conflict. The Foreign Ministries of member states aided the aims of the CFSP, that if not a member would not have been able to provide such assistance even if they had desired. The construct of the CFSP that has allowed for a coordinated approach in interoperability with regards to security policy formulation, application and consolidation has been as a result of the development of such institutions as the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Union and Security Policy agencies (ISS) and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC). These institutions have distinct roles being either technical, scientific or managerial in nature and assist with the European Unions ability to deal with crisis management; either internal or external, by improving the current and projected future defence capabilities of the member states whilst also maintaining a viable European Union defence industry. This structure and the unique arrangement with both NATO and third parties has ensured that the policies recommended by the PSC are well researched, analysed and articulated to meet the European Union’s foreign and security policy requirements.

‘Referencing the European Union within the theoretical guidelines of international relations, the main problem of using historical notions of Foreign Policy as put forward by scholars of International Relations as Holsti or Allen are highlighted by the European Union’s unique status of being a regional actor where the member states forfeit sovereignty entitlements for membership gains, yet this arrangement is still inline with the intent of the Westphalian system. The European Union has maintained habits of policy consultation and coordination through the EPC since 1970 and is still a flexible and collective yet pluralistic identity that is proactive in its pursuit of Foreign Policy formation as an international actor for the purpose of exerting significant influence on world politics and economic systems.’(refer footnote 16) European Union Foreign and Security policy initiatives have not been restricted to the European continent or region. They have been actively involved in global initiatives by providing funding, technology, knowledge or expertise to assist with the management and implementation of such initiatives, ultimately pursuing a foreign policy of positive engagement. This proactive approach taken by the European Union is to facilitate their CFSP of crisis prevention ensuring that states do not become either regional or global issues, requiring responsive intervention by either state or international institutions. Examples can be traced back to intervention assistance with conflict prevention via negotiation as with the Middle East Peace Process, providing funding and executive expertise to Afghanistan and Iraq and provision of legislation adopting green policies as with the European Union Waste management. It has also allowed individual states on either a bilateral or multilateral basis to pursue European Union interest through negotiation, as has been the case with Iran. Divergence from the CFSP provided does not go against the common interest would be perceivable without interference by either pressure from other member states or internally by constituents that have moved to the member state from another. Individual state Foreign Ministers are aware of this and are more likely to prevent policy formulation or decision-making in the Council by not allowing a consensus, as opposed to developing national policies that are not reflective of the common European interest.

Footnotes

1 Shaun Riorden, The New Diplomacy, Cambridge, 2003, p.31
2 Christopher Hill & Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, 2005, p.155
3 Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein & Richard Langhorne, Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy, London, 2002, p.299
4 Charlotte Bretherton & John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London, 1999, p.139
5 Morten Kelstrup & Michael Williams. International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community, London, 2000, p.171
6 Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin & Ella Ritchie, France in the European Union, Hampshire, 1988, p.25 De Gaulle was quite influential on the European Union initial policy formulation. Policies that were agreed upon during his time were in relation to his desire to ensure that his aim of ensuring that France remains a dominant international player in both leadership and arms trade. At the time arms trade was a lucrative international business for the wealthier Western Bloc countries as well as for Russia. De Gaulle was proactive in his activities with European integration although his efforts were not always successive. As identified by the failure of De Gaulle’s Fouchet Plan.
7 Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin & Ella Ritchie, France in the European Union, Hampshire, 1988, p.22
8 Jorg Freidrichs, 2004. European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A house with many mansions. London, 2004, p.93 Friedrich further elaborated that with regards to European Common Foreign and Security Policy formulation, Kenneth Glarbo identified that if it is referred to social constructivism terms, it easier to identify that the avenue taken by the respective national diplomats has been an increasingly routine multilateral approach towards their fellow diplomats.
9 European Union, Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, Brussels, 2005, P.2
10 Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003, p.1
11 Ariel Cohen & Conway Irwin, Turkey: A Linchpin in Pipeline Politics, more than ever. Washington, 2006, p.8 Both Cohen and Irwin identify that even though Turkey does not have substantial natural gas reserves, within the next five years it is likely to be the main hub for the gas and possibly the oil trade between Russia, Central Asia the Middle East and the European Union. Accession to the European Union would benefit the European Union economically by this role taken on by Turkey but Cohen and Irwin do not elaborate if accession, considering the current political and social attitudes affiliated with Turkey minority groups would affect the stability and cohesion of the European Union. The requirements for accession have been implemented by the European Union to ensure that such attitudes or affiliations can be adequately policed by the state system to ensure the maintenance of stability of the wider regional community within the Union.
12 Christopher Hill & Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, 2005, p.141
13 Rubin Michael, Dangerous Cycle: North Korea, Iran, and repetitive diplomatic failure.
14 Christopher Hill & Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, 2005, p.143-144
15 Mathias Jopp, The Strategic Implications of European Integration, London, 1994, p.68 Mathias highlighted that the enlargement program of the European Union although politically effective means of developing a CFSP construct by allowing the member states a consensus form of policy development was in fact not necessarily the best method for applying security measures with the arrangement at the time between NATO and the WEU. This was elaborated by the two different approaches taken by the members of the European Union with regards to perceived security constructs for the developing Union. One was lead by the British which placed more emphasis on the NATO arrangement and the other was led by France and Germany that identified that the European Union needed a purely European format that would allow for the European Union to continue with contributing to crisis management and practical military cooperation that did not rely on the NATO structure or institutions or rely on NATO for intervention into non Article V missions as the US could not be relied upon for intervening in issues that were not reflective of concern for their national interests. Mathias further elaborated that the WEU in its current construct before the Maastricht Treaty in attempting to include Central and Eastern European states for policy formation was seen as undermining the NATO arrangement as well as developing roles that without the development of supporting infrastructure and institutions would not be able to perform its required functions as the security guarantees provided by NATO were only for NATO membership states as opposed to European Union member states.
16 Christopher Hill & Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, 2005, p.141





Bibliography

Bretherton, Charlotte & Vogler John. 1999. The European Union as a Global Actor. London: Routledge.

Clark, David. Kinnock, Neil. Leahy, Michael. Livingstone, Ken. Monks, John & Twigg, Stephen. 2005. A New Deal for Social Europe. The Foreign Policy Centre. September 2005. [Online]. Available: http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/591.pdf [2006, October 31]

Cohen, Ariel & Irwin, Conway. 2006. Turkey: The Linchpin in Pipeline Politics. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. Bi-Weekly Briefing Vol.8 No21. 01 November 2006. [Online]. Available: http:// www.cacianalyst.org/issues/20061101Analyst.pdf [2006, November 11]

Europa. 2006. Common Foreign and Security Policy agencies. Europa Agencies of the European Union. [Online]. Available: http://europa.eu/agencies/security_agencies/index_en.htm [2006, November 07]

European Union. 2005. Treaty of Maastricht on European Union. Summaries of Legislation. February 2005. [Online]. Available: http://europe.eu/scadplus/treaties/maastricht_en.htm [2006, October 31]

Fink-Hooijer, Florika. 1994. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. European Journal of International Law. 5EJIL (1994) 1-198 [Online]. Available: http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol5/No2/art2.html. [2006, November 07]

Friedrichs, Jorg. 2004. European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A house with many mansions. London: Routledge.

Guyomarch, Alain. Machin, Howard & Ritchie Ella. 1988. France in the European Union. Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd.

Hill, Christopher & Smith, Michael. 2005. International Relations and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.

Hoon, Geoff. 2006. Unifying the European Market-Speech. Global Agenda Conference. 02 November 2006. [Online]. Available: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front [2006, November 06]

Jopp, Mathias. 1994. The Strategic Implications of European Integration. Adelphi Paper 290, London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd.

Kelstrup, Morten & Williams, Michael. 2000. International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community. London: Routledge.

Krahmann, Elke. 2003. Multilevel Networks in European Foreign Policy. Hampshire: Ashgate Pub Ltd.

Mastny, Vojtech. 1986. Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security: Analysis and Documentation. Durham: Duke Univ Press.

Riorden, Shaun. 2003. The New Diplomacy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Rubin, Michael. 2006. Dangerous Cycle: North Korea, Iran, and repetitive diplomatic failure. National Review Online. 6 July 2006. [Online]. Available: http://www.meforum.org/article/971 [2006, November 01]

Schild, Joachim. 2003. Power Play or Declining Power? German European Diplomacy Risks Losing Influence. December 2003. [Online]. Available: http://deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/digest/op-ed_inhalt_11.php [2006, October 31]

Solana, Javier. 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. December 2003. [Online]. Available: http://xxxxxxxxxx [2006, October 31]

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 17 November 1990. [Online]. Available: http://osce.org/documents/doclib/1990/11/13752_en.pdf [2006, November 07]
(Military balance between two groups of states by providing equal cailings for major weapons and equipment systems. From Atlantic to Urals.

Wight, Martiin. 1978. Power Politics. London: Leicester Univ Press.

Multipolarity - French, Russian and Chinese Foreign Policy - Risks and Benefits

Outline the Theory of Multipolarity, as favoured in French, Russian and Chinese Foreign Policy. Can this idea help balance the International System, or does it have risks as well as possible benefits.

‘At the end of the Cold War came the belief that being governed by a balance of power and the associated realist approach to international relations was no longer required.’ (refer footnote 1) The United States was preserving a unipolar system reflective of the hierarchical system of the medieval period, the threat of war which some considered associated with the balance of power theory, was considered no longer a threat to the international system. When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 and the bipolar system of international order with states arranged in bipolar alliances based on whether they were in support of either the United States or the Soviet Union appeared to be moving into a Unipolar system with the United states becoming the main power due to its extensive economic and military strength and reflective of its mission for global reform. Both Russia and China promoted the development of a multipolar system for maintenance of international order in response to this movement as they identified a unipolar system was not in their national interest and was a threat to their survivability as there would be no balance of power which would mean limited cooperation and competition between states would not be equal but based on the United States foreign policy. Similarly European states were supportive of a multipolar system as opposed to following the movement towards a unipolar system as it was reflective of their heritage. Henry Kissenger identified European foreign policy as being reflective of the balance of power system whilst the United States foreign policy was primarily based on the self appointed mission of global reform. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American writer from the nineteenth century, ‘believed that America should be strong and wield a positive influence in international affairs and throw her weight into maintaining a balance of power in both Europe and the Far East instead of pursuing a form of isolationism for the common interests of civilisations.’ (refer footnote 2)Both were reflective of their own unique circumstances.

To define Multipolarity one needs to have an understanding of the balance of power politics that in essence deals with states administering their sovereignty over their territory and advancing their national interests inclusive of power within an international system with other states to maintain a form of international order. The focus of this essay will be on the theory of multipolarity, as favoured by the French, Russian and Chinese Foreign Policy and how it can balance the International System. Although there are risks and benefits associated with a multipolar system, a state that is cognisant of these risks and benefits can ensure that they position themselves effectively increasing their susceptibility towards maximising the benefits and reducing the risk ensuring their survivability. Before we can forward on assessing whether the theory of multipolarity can balance the international system, the idea or essence of power needs to be defined in context with international order and the international system. In this paper it is intended to define power, international order and how multipolarity, and the balance of power concept, affects the international system. Eurasia, concentrating on the Caucasus and Central Asia, being the center of the new game for international political interaction, will be used to highlight the effects of this theoretical approach to international relations.

Power and the way states pursue power is interpreted differently by different states based on their societal architecture, ideology, historical political experience and their economic stability. Their idea of power, how to gain it and how to exert it is usually reflective of their experiences, knowledge and perceived experience of other states.
States that follow either a classical and structural realists ideology ‘argue that power is the most significant factor in international politics is reflective of human nature. Structural realists go further in identifying that the anarchic structure of international politics shapes most international systems as states pursue power to preserve their security as opposed to the pursuit of power being reflective of human nature.’ (refer footnote 3) Hans Morganthau identified that a state’s power is related to its ‘geographical size, the quality and quantity of the population units, quality and quantity of armaments and the conduct of foreign affairs. He further elaborated that the conduct of foreign affairs is probably the most elusive and most important when defining a states power as it is how a state interacts and uses its power to influence the actions of other states.(refer footnote 4) To clearly identify each element accurately is difficult but it is only once there is either a crisis or war that the relative strength of a state’s power is clearly defined in terms of the balance of power. Power predominantly was identified as being reflective of military power and conflict was quite common between the states as they flexed this power. Walter Lippmann, an early twentieth century writer “defended the thesis that plans for national security and world order must always be consonant with the realities of power.” (refer footnote 5) During the Cold War where power politics was at the for front of a states foreign policy, especially for the Soviet Union and the United States, the balance of power was bipolar and predominantly stable with the exception of the Cuban military crisis where the potential for a crisis to escalate towards war, possibly nuclear, between the two super powers was abated through diplomacy via negotiation as opposed to military force in their efforts to alleviate the crisis and regain stability. The movement of Russian military hardware to Cuba was seen as a movement towards a change in the balance of power on behalf of the Soviet Union and with any change provoked a reaction from the United States that observed it as a threat to their security and survivability to operate as a super power equal to the Soviet Union. Today, the United States and Russia are still dominant powers but they now compete with the European Union, China, Great Britain, India and smaller states that form alliances or ally themselves with other states to improve their power base.

Hans Morgenthau further elaborated how the desire of a state to attain power is equivalent to the desire to revolt against power and that as the intricate web that makes up the balance of power can prevent crisis, similarly this web can also cause a crisis. Dependent on a competitive state’s power and the power of those states that are aligned with it, influences a states’ desire to challenge the power of the competitive state through war even if the state being challenged is the weaker state. Today with the effects of globalisation we need to consider the balance of commerce as well as the balance of power to effectively identify the strength of a state. Susan Strange, a twentieth century structural realist ‘identified four distinct structures of power being; the power to influence ideas of others, the power to control their access to credit, the power to control their prospects for security and the power to control their chances of a better life as producers and consumers.’ (refer footnote 6) She has been able to define the balance of power incorporating the balance of commerce within her four structures of power that has overlapped the influence of territorial advancement and military capability in analysing a states power and ability to influence the actions of other states in today’s multipolar system. The newly independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, being small and underdeveloped, are susceptible to the influence of the more stronger states of India, China, Russia the United States as well as the European Union that are pursuing their own national interests within this geographical location that has been identified by many scholars as the area for the new Game. Due to the strong Islamic base of the neighbouring southern states to both Central Asia and the Caucasus and their own strong Islamic culture, they are also influenced by the Islamic states of the Middle East, most notably Saudi Arabia providing financial support for the development of Islamic schools and Mosques.

During the Cold War Central Asia and the Caucasus were seen as a stable area internationally as it was not an area contested by the United States and its Allies and the Communist and Communist associated states. The system that the states operated in under the Soviet Union can be defined as Unipolar with Russia assuming the role of the major power exerting its influence over the smaller, weaker Republics and territories. Internally the states were subject to instability as they had been socialised with little regard for their ethnicity, culture, race and religion with many Republics being subject to internal conflict. Islam being a major influential factor amongst the states was not embraced by the Russians accordingly which along with having no experience in running a modern state has led the way for the current instability associated with the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia today. Russian staff were moved to the states to fulfil public administrative roles for the management of each republics advancement and the advancement of the Soviet Union economy that was based on cotton production, mining and resource extraction at the peril of food crops causing the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus to be dependent on imports. Localised industries were streamlined or not cultivated resulting in a dependence relationship developing between the Republics and Russia for their wellbeing. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union at the bequest of Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine, ‘an act that was identified as a declaration that the Slavic (white) part of the former Soviet Union no longer wished to share responsibility for helping cope with problems in the Asian part, the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus were left to deal with their personal administration for advancing their own national interests within a dependent relationship on Russia whilst dealing with the fact that race, culture, ethnicity and religion would play influential roles in their advancement within the international system.’ (refer footnote 7) The states have had to pursue significant reform mechanisms to advance themselves both economically and socially, pursing relationships with other states whilst being cognisant of their historical and current strong dependence relationship with Russia. Russia’s historical relationship with the people of Central Asia and even the Caucasus has been turbulent with its application of policy towards the Islamic majority community causing much of the internal conflict identified today within the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Since the sixteenth century, Russians have exerted their power over this region, trying to convert the people to Christianity by ‘redistributing land to Russian nobles and monasteries, colonising the region with Russian peasants and artisans, destroying mosques, closing Quran schools and waqfs seized by the Russian territory. Although throughout history, this persecution has not been consistent, as with the new policies that were introduced by Catherine the Great in 1773 where she encouraged commercial success as opposed to religious persecution that opened the way to European education and eventually stimulated an intellectual enlightenment. (refer footnote 8) It is pertinent to mention China and its application of policy towards Xinjiang (formerly eastern Turkestan), considering China is a major power pursuing its national interests within Central Asia similar to Russia has a historical relationship with Central Asia. Similar to Russia, China’s policy towards Islam has not been consistent. China has had an affiliation with Central Asia most notably since the Ming Dynasty where it adopted a more liberal approach towards integration as ‘it allowed the indigenous population to remained a politically subordinate non-Chinese population that was provided with security and commercial prosperity, the population was not required to assimilate similar to the Chinese Hui .’(refer footnote 9 & 10) Today with the influence of Islam and the influence of the idea of Islamic fundamentalism, both Russia and China have pursued an interdependence approach to their relationship with the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia has an interest to ensure the integrity and stability of these southern states as many Russians reside in these states and they form a security perimeter to the unstable non-modernised Islamic state of Afghanistan. The creation of the SCO although not an alliance has identified that the member states view each as an ally with regards to security and cooperation and dealing with the Islamic revival as each member state, especially since September 11, has had to revisit the Islamic question and the policies they have pursued for Islamic integration within their state system as well as dealing with the old territorial disputes of redefining borders to prevent cross border disputes and illegal trafficking of drugs and personnel.

The model for a states application and gaining of power is based on the lessons learnt from either their own experiences or the experiences of other states. For the states that make up the Caucasus and Central Asia; where independence is only new, internal stability is limited, there is still a strong dependence relationship with Russia, and their relationship with international actors as other states, international organisations, non government organisations and multinational corporations is haphazard, applying their new power base and gaining power through their potentially strong resource based economy has been a difficult transition for them. The influence and rules of a multipolar system have been thrust upon these states as they have gone from a unipolar relationship with Russia under the guise of the Soviet Union into a multipolar system with access to other states to form alliances or ally themselves with as well as becoming members of international organisations and engaging multinational corporations to assist their domestic state building and international integration within the International system of diplomacy, balance of power and balance of commerce politics. ‘The mindless armaments race and rigid alliances of the bipolar cold war where the United States and the Soviet Union established spheres of influence were no longer reflective of the balance of power relationship that prevailed in the new multipolar world.’ (refer footnote 11) The Caucasus and Central Asian states with independence were able to pursue alliances and alignments with states other than Russia for their economic and social advancement. This pursuit was hindered by their strong dependence relationship with Russia. Their administrative staff being of Soviet origin and their resource based industries being streamlined, Uzbekistan with cotton and gold production, Kyrgyzstan with military production and Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Turkmenistan with oil production or none existent industries as with the other states of Tajikistan, Armenia and Georgia and ‘the republics themselves prior to independence running up large trade deficits that were covered by union transfers. Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan have also had to deal with protracted regional conflict or civil wars, which affected and are still affecting, their economic and political transitions whilst Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have had to deal with being land locked, their transport infrastructure being orientated towards the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and a resultant rapid build up of large foreign debt.’(refer footnote 12)

With independence, other states, realising the resource and power potential of the area and finally being able to deal directly with their state administrations’ as opposed to dealing with Russia under the guise of the Soviet Union, have courted them providing a dynamic political arena for the states to operate within. Although these states can be classed individually as weak states, troubled by ideology based internal conflict with limited development and modernisation, the multipolar system and associated balance of power has allowed these states to become empowered and able to provide some weight to negotiating foreign policy, aide and trade agreements. It has given the states a chance to become proactive in their financial affairs and demand world prices for their resources as opposed to the reduced prices placed on them by the Soviet Union prior to independence. This was more effective for the states with an agricultural based economies than the states with the energy based economies that were competing with the states of the Middle East. ‘State’s such as with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were able to be more dynamic in their choice of alliances and trade partners as their natural resource industries were well developed where as the states of Azerbaijan and Kazakstan required expanded infrastructure to support their natural resource industries and are reliant on outside investment to support these industries.’ (refer footnote 13) The political administrative staffs for these states are predominately soviet citizens that have loyalty towards Russia that requires balance against their responsibility for the welfare and advancement of their own state. Similarly Russia has an interest in these states as there are a large number of Russian citizens residing in them and their ability to contain internal conflict and prevent the spread of Islamic militant movements threaten Russia’s national interests and its borders. The emergence of India, China , the European Union as strong political powers with national interests, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt with ideological interests within this geographical area along with the traditional powers of Russia and the United States with national interests have placed the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia in the center of a dynamic multipolar system with the balance of power being dynamic as it is continually challenged and adapting with the change in the environment.

In essence the ‘balance of power theory assumes that major powers, in the pursuit of increased security and influence, will combine forces with other nations that share the same interests. These alliances will change as situations change however every major power’s essential identity will be preserved.’ (refer footnote 14) Zlatco Isakov reiterating the writings of the German philosopher and poet Freidrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), and that of an American historian Steven Lukes ‘politics is in separable from power, and states and governments exist to wield power, whether it be domestic or international and consequently, politics itself is defined as the struggle for power or vis versa, the ability to rule, mainly implying the ability to impose one’s will upon another which is often but not always achieved through ones use of force, i.e. Coercion by economic or military means to achieve ones own goals or interests.’ (refer footnote 15) Kenneth Waltz identified that ‘a balance of power politics prevails whenever two and only two conditions are met; that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive. He further elaborated that in a multipolar system, states rely on alliances to maintain security and identified this as unstable, as there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw a clear and fixed line between allies and adversaries. A state that may be an ally in one area may also be an adversary in another dependent on its national interests at the time and the states it chooses to define as ally or adversary. Dependent on the weighting placed on the area being negotiated will influence the strength of the ally or adversary relationship in relation to the ally or adversary relationship that it defines within another area.’ (refer footnote 16) The strength that ties states together on one issue of national interest can be counteracted by the strength of mutual disagreement within another issue requiring them to seek alternative states to foster relationships with common national interests. Although Waltz identifies that a multipolar system is unstable, the will of a state to survive within it in itself induces stability as a state pursues a change in alliances, cooperation through international organisations and engages multinational corporations to meet its needs for survival and ‘allowing the principle of reciprocity to function it provides information about others’ preferences, intentions and behaviour ensuring its survivability and the survivability of its allies.’ (refr footnote 17) Instead of pursuing the historical realist approach incorporating coercive diplomacy and possibly war a state has the option to pursue an interdependence approach engaging all actors, on all levels and in all environments.

A multipolar system for the balance of power is not new and can be traced back to the eighteenth century when the European states of Spain, Portugal, France, England, Russia, Prussia and Austria dependent on their national interests and security needs would form and break alliances with each other on a regular basis, and would acquire territories through colonisation or acquisition by force, continually changing the balance of power and preventing hegemony and dominance by any one state. The loss of a colony through independence did not necessarily mean the loss of power to a state as the colony was ‘still linked by culture and speech easing trade between the two even though the political link was severed.’ (refer footnote 18) The Central Asian and Caucasus states were originally seen by Russia as an extension of their territory as opposed to colonies and were indoctrinated into Russian society assuming a common language, integrated transport and communication systems, adopting similar architecture and having their industries streamlined for the common good of the Soviet Union as opposed to the common good of the individual Republic or territory. Their power was reflective of the power of Russia and the Soviet Union on the whole, individually within this national system they were significantly weaker, plagued by civil unrest, lower education levels and restricted to predominately primary industries. With independence came a chance for the states to pursue alliances and ally themselves with states other than Russia, it gave them choice and a chance to advance their own culture and power within an international system. Allowing for the United States to establish military bases in their efforts to fight terrorism within Afghanistan within their borders has also opened up opportunities for them to pursue security and economic advancement through the joining of international organisations and the engagement of multinational corporations for the development of alternative industries as well as consolidating the extraction of their natural resources within their requirements and requests. The Shanghi Cooperation Organisation(SCO) is one cooperation that was formed in June 2001 to promote stability and economic cooperation between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These states have pursued a mechanism of cooperation, where they can pursue dialogue to advance their national interests and power within the international system. It has not managed to change policy but has advanced cooperation between the states and has been successful in attracting further membership as with India pitching for full membership and the states of Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia maintaining observer status. (refer footnote 19) Issues dealt with by the SCO are pertinent to all member states, even though the SCO cannot change domestic policy of the member states as is available to the European Union (refer footnote 20) the transfer of dialogue, ideas and experience influences the policy of each member state. Although Russia and China are significant powers in their own right and provide a significant amount of the funding for the SCO, through the cooperation the power base of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have increased significantly. These states with similar interests are able to utilise the SCO to increase their overall power, provide themselves with competitiveness within the international system, especially with regards to security and economic development. The effects of globalisation, significantly improved transportation and communication systems, has also provided these states with further opportunities that were not available to them when they were part of the Soviet Union. Especially, considering the ease in which they have been able to advance their status by pursuing cooperation between states via such mechanisms as the SCO or pursuing bilateral or multilateral arrangements in trade, military activities, education and social advancement to ensure their economic viability and security.

As balance of power is central to both a bipolar and multipolar system and has been referred to continually through this paper, it would be pertinent here to identify what is actually meant by balance of power. Muthiah Alagappa defined balance of power as where there is an existence of two or more great powers with overall similar capabilities are able to balance each other out. (refer footnote 21) One state may be more advanced militarily but with a weak economy but in comparison they both possess similar powers. This is a simplistic view of defining the balance of power but does identify that it encompasses both hard and soft power. For hard power we are referring to a States military power, its ability to foster alliances, court allies and align itself with other states to boost its perceived military power. Military power can be broken into two aspects personnel and hardware. For the personnel aspect you would consider the size, training, experience, endurance, flexibility, age and the command and control structure encompassing the personnel that make up its military. For hardware you would be considering age, sophistication, redundancy, numbers, interoperability, maintenance, source, munition stocks and technical aspects related to its military equipment. Equipment that is easily sourced maintained well and in abundant supply will ultimately boost a states military power. Within a multipolar system the sourcing of equipment and training for military means is diversified, quite competitive and complex. Initial expenditure by the state is significantly reduced as they are able to negotiate a suitable package considering that they are not restricted to one supplier. The disadvantage with utilising different sources is exposed in the maintenance, repair and replacement costs associated with equipment that is not interoperable. If the supplying state suddenly classifies the recipient state as an adversary, the supply chain is cut leaving the recipient state with aging equipment and training support that is unable to be effectively maintained, repaired or resupplied. The recipient state would be required to source equipment with similar capability from alternative sources resulting in the initial low cost of expenditure being increased significantly. The exchange of military capability is one avenue for increasing or decreasing a states power base as it identifies a states likely allies in time of conflict. Agreements are made between states to ensure that the recipient state does not release the technology or training to an adversary state of the supplier and Vis versa that the supplier does not release the technology to an adversary of the recipient state. With changing alliances and changes to the balance of power a state that is defined one day as an ally can be equally defined the next as an adversary, providing confusion as to technology ownership and usability. Edward Kolodziej succinctly identified soft power as power pursued through advancement in scientific knowledge, technological innovation, economic wealth and ideological values to ensure their competitiveness within the global system and their attractiveness to other states that pursue similar areas for advancement and power. (refer footnote 22) A state that is significantly technologically advanced with a small population can in theory balance out a state that is rich in natural resources with a large population in the economic sphere. Both states balance as they become dependent on each other to pursue their own national interests. The first state provides the scientific knowledge and technical innovation for the extraction of the second’s natural resources; whilst the second, provides the labour and source for resources required by the first. Zlatko Isakovic identified power in the terms of political power “which comprised of three basic elements of social power (population, territory and economic potential) and elements specific to political power (military force, political system, ideology and morale).’ (refer footnote 23) Referring back to the example referencing population and technological advancement, it is only since the Industrial Revolution that such states have been able to balance each other out as prior to, the state with the larger population would have been able to wield more power as it would have been able to employ more personnel within the military and numbers as opposed to weapon sophistication which directly correlated to a states political power. Today resources and technological advancement increases a states political power significantly as it directly relates to a states economic potential which as a soft power has become more influential on the global stage than military might. A states sovereignty, unless there is a morale or ideology issue not reflective of international consensus, is less likely to be breached by another states’ or actors (regional or global security cooperation ie. European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), United Nations(UN)) military organisation. Military force can serve as a deterrent or can be used for coercive action, similar to economic sanctions dependent on the issue. For the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, on the whole are rich in natural resources but lack the scientific knowledge and technical innovation for the independent extraction or production of these natural resources as well as having been left with large trade deficits lack the capital to fund such extraction or production. During the Soviet error they were dependent on the scientific knowledge, technical innovation and financial support from Russia to maintain and develop these primary industries. Russia’s approach was based on its own national interests and did not significantly advance these industries to their full potential leaving the respective Republics under developed, with little modernisation planning and with their current social problems with inadequate integration of Islam within society for the large Muslim population living with in these Republics, in civil crisis. Their military is significantly Russian orientated with Russian hardware and training. Since independence and the war against terrorism that allowed the United States to establish bases within the states of Central Asia, this restriction or dependence on Russian hardware and training is likely to cease as a new market for equipment and training, predominantly western sourced is likely to improve their military power base increasing their ability to prevent escalation of internal conflict or movement of internal conflict from neighbouring states across their borders.

Realists and neo realists agree that the desire to pursue power is a permanent and fundamental property of the international system that is directed upon the state. Alternative to neo realist theory and its reliance on a state pursuing military power, alliances or allying themselves with other states to improve their power position on the global and regional stage, states can also pursue power by other means, as the enhancement of their soft power. The way that this power is allocated, utilised or configured is dependent on how states develop their own power base and how they interact with other states within the international system to maintain international order. ‘As envisioned at Westphalia as a laissez-faire process to maintain international stability through the balance of power, the joining of states in special relationships as the pursuit by a great power to unilaterally assert its authority is certain to provoke stiff resistance by the others, as the history of the Thirty Years War and all other periods of attempt at hegemony readily reveal.’ (refer footnote 24) Russia during the Soviet Union period and the Cold War unilaterally asserted its authority on those states that made up the Soviet Union and on its disintegration was in a position to continue with this authority through indirect means under the guise of trade and security issues. The states were dependent on Russia for trade as Russia was their main customer for their natural resources and source of processed consumer goods. With regards to security, on independence the states were not prepared to deal with illicit trafficking of drugs, goods and personnel as with Islamic militants as their borders were subject to dispute as they were not well defined or community based. The states had limited power to deal with these issues as they did not have sufficient military or policing expertise. Russia with twenty percent of its population Muslim was aware of the threat posed by the free movement of Islamic militants and aware that if it did not assist with the border security issues, the illicit trade would penetrate its border. Similarly China’s Xinjiang Province has a high Muslim population and the illicit trade adversely affects its stability and economic prosperity.

The military operations in Afghanistan provided an opportunity for the Central Asian states to engage the international system independently and multilaterally instead of under the guise of only the SCO. The United States was able to forward deploy service personnel and equipment to bases within the Central Asian states in their fight against terrorism and the Taliban of Afghanistan. This gave the United States and its allies ‘a better-coordinated engagement with the Central Asian states on security cooperation, development of Caspian energy reserves, political and economic reform. The advantages for the Central Asian states it provided them with leverage when dealing on the international stage with other states, especially Russia and China, both of which have the same issues relating to the region as a concern for their national interests and pursue and which they have a multilateral relationship with through the SCO.’ (refer footnote 25) The relationship with the Central Asian states for the United States provided a mechanism to advance the United States national interests not only with the war on terrorism but also advancing their economic interests as with engaging with multinational corporations for trading in oil and gas extraction, production and purchase. Similarly China and India have identified this underdeveloped market and industry for oil and gas as beneficial for their own national interests and have also engaged with multinational corporations for the extraction, production and purchase of oil and gas. Diversifying the market available to the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, improving their power base for negotiating more lucrative investments that improve their social, political and cultural status. The states still need to deal with reform, as their political administrations are still underdeveloped in comparison to western standards but reform has been initiated by the various states to improve within this area. Dependent on the reform that the states have chosen to pursue and their ability to achieve it themselves is significantly influenced by the states that they have chosen to ally with and the states that they have chosen to perceive as an adversary.

Multipolarity is different to hegemony, which relies on the presence of one great power that defines the collective goals and rules within the international system. “Hegemony requires a preponderance of material resources, a sense of social purpose, the ability to control international outcomes of importance to the dominant state, and some degree of consent and acceptance from other states in the system. (refer footnote 26) In reference to Euroasia, the Soviet Union, during its time can be identified as a hegemonic based on Russia, for the associated territories that were encapsulated into Union. Russia, being a secular society where there was no divine law governing human society enforced its legal system and policies affecting political, economic and social structure on the states within the Soviet Union inducing a Russian assimilation. New Republics, most notably in Central Asia and the Caucasus were formed based on geographical location as opposed to community, social or religious structures. Divided communities increased the influence of the Russian power on these Republics, especially considering that Russian citizens were moved to the territories to administer the changed formations and post disintegration of the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders and Soviet citizens predominately perform the public and administrative roles within the independent states whilst the indigenous society maintain the more traditional labour roles either in agriculture or resource extraction and were restricted from advancing in any high level education or advancement. The unipolar system became a large resource and economic drain on Russia that lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Similarly, on a global scale, the unipolar system identified with the United States post the Cold War has highlighted the disadvantages again of such a system. The United States’ resources both military and economic have been greatly reduced as they have been required to be involved in numerous campaigns in support of the United Nations and in unilateral engagement. This reduction can be identified as imperial overstretch highlighting that such a system cannot be maintained. Dependent on how a unipolar system is administered by the super power influences the reaction of those states operating within its influence. It can be encouraging to other states and induce support or alternatively it can be seen as bullying tactics and induce resentment resulting in structured and unstructured protest by other states or organisations based on political, social or ideological grounds. This places significant burden both morally and economically on the super power place in such a position. The advantage of a multipolar system is that no one superpower is placed in such a position. There are a number of equal great powers that through a complex web of domestic economic and military factors, pursuit of alliances and allying themselves with other states, joining of international organisations and engaging multinational corporations are able to balance out their power in relation to the power of the other states. Each mechanism available to them is a means to advance their own national interests on either a domestic, regional or global scale where an ally domestically, militarily, socially, culturally, economically or ideology may be also an adversary also either domestically, militarily, socially, culturally, economically or ideologically. Multipolarity induces cooperation, exchange of dialogue and experiences militarily, economically, culturally and ideologically, and dependent on a states national interests, can limit instability and new authoritarianism. This is evident in the number of international organisations that have been established since the cold war for economic and security advancement of states on both a global and regional scale. The international organisations, with the exception of the United Nations on a global scale and the European Union on a regional scale, are not a power above the member states but a mechanism for the states to pursue power and advancement of their national interests within dialogue and negotiation. States joining such organisations due so with the understanding that decisions and policy made within the organisations are not legally binding but morally required to be adhered to by them and other member states. Power within the multipolar system is identified as a commodity and requires the sequencing of steps or actions taken by a state to ensure their survivability and growth within the international system. A disadvantage and an area where the states take risk within a multipolar system is that with such a complex form if integration it is difficult to identify competition, or a state trying to take a competitive advantage in one area to influence their competitiveness within another area that they identify as a higher priority for advancing their national interests and foreign policy coordination. States tend to hedge their bets, assessing all avenues or mechanisms available to them, ensuring that they do not place themselves in a situation that could result in their survival being placed into question, reducing the risk that they are willing to subjugate. For the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus in their current weak state economically, socially and politically, a multipolar system offers more benefits than risks. The area is dynamic, rich in natural resources, culture, and socially accepted amongst their peers, in a political sense as functioning states able to be members of international organisations, conduct trade on a regional and global scale and to be able to engage multinational corporations to pursue their security, social and economic development. Similarly they are accepted in an ideological sense with many Muslim countries, most notably Saudi Arabia offering support for Islamic schools and mosques. The current civil unrest, movement of Islamic fundamentalism and transnational crime issues currently experienced by many of these states is an issue that can be dealt with via a multipolar system ensuring that there is a balance of power within the region ensuring a balance to the international system.

Footnotes

1 Greg Fry & Jacinta O’Hagan, Contending Images of World Politics, London, 2000, p.48.
2 Edward M. Burns, Ideas in Conflict, London, 1960, p.473.
3 Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller, The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, London,1995, p.x.
4 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace, New York, 1985, p.224.
5 Burns, op. cit., p.517.
6 Martin Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, London, 1999, p.43.
7 Suryakant N. Bal, Central Asia: A Strategy for India’s Look-North Policy, New Delhi, 2004, p.125.
8 Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies 2nd Ed, Cambridge, 2002, p.344.
9 Ira Lapidus defined Hui as that which applies to Chinese both assimilated foreigners and Chinese converts who are of the Muslim faith yet have adopted the Chinese way of life with the exception of prayer rituals, Arabic names and communal affiliations.
10 ibid., p.353.
11 Henry Kissenger, Diplomacy, New York, 1994, p.166.
12 Richard M. Auty and Indra D. Soysa, Energy, Wealth and Governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia, New York, 2006, p.94.
13 ibid., p.40.
14 Rendall W. Stiles, Case Histories in International politics, New York, 2004, p.51.
15 Zlatko Isakovic, Introduction to a Theory of Political Power in International Relations, England, 2000, p.10.
16 Griffiths, op. cit., p.48.
17 ibid., p.48.
18 Burns, op. cit., p.507.
19 Richard W. X. Hu’s paper published in the Central Asia At the End of the Transition, identified that the SCO was a multilateral cooperation built on the Shanghi Spirit of equality and mutual benefits. He further elaborated that some thought that it would provide a mechanism to help form multipolarity in world politics. Although still a young organization it has provided a vehicle for the member states to advance policy related to security and economic issues on a regional level. It does share a similar stance on separatism and terrorism to that of the United States and has allowed China, Russia and the United States to maintain stable relations in Central Asia.
20 Within the EU each state that joins gives up its absolute sovereignty and permits other states to have a certain say in its international affairs. The member states refer to public administration that affects internal administration for each state as opposed to relying on civil military.
21 Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Order, Stanford, 2003, p.54.
22 Edward A. Kolodziej, Security and International Relations, Cambridge, 2005, p.136.
23 Isakovic, op. cit., p.13.
24 Charles W. Kegley Jr & Gregory A Raymond, Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium, New Jersey, p.200.
25 Boris Rumer, Central Asia at the End of the Transition, New York, 2005, p.102.
Alagappa, op. cit.,



Bibliography

Alagappa, Muthiah. 2003. Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative features. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Auty, Richard M. & Soysa D. Indra, 2006. Energy, Wealth and Governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Great Britain: Routledge.

Axtmann, Roland. 1996. Liberal democracy into the twenty-first century: GLobalization, integration and the nation-state. Manchester: Manchester Univ Press.

Bal, Suryakant N. 2004. Central Asia: A Strategy for India’s Look-North Policy. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors.

Bobbio, Norberto. 1989. Democracy and Dictatorship: The nature and limits of State Power. Trans Peter Kennealy. Minneapolis: Univ of Minnesota Press.

Brown, Michael. Lynn-Jones, Sean. & Miller, Steven E. 1995. The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security. London: The Mit Press.

Cooley, John K. 2002. Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism. 3rd ed. London: Pluto Press.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 1996. Pacific Russia: Risks and Rewards. Canberra, ACT.

Evans, C. 2005. Identify and Discuss the ways in which two Muslim societies in Asia have gone about restoring sharia.. Unpublished paper; University of New England

Franck, Irene, and David Brownstone. 1986. The Silk Road: A History. New York: Facts on File Publications.

Frankel, Francine R. & Harding, Harry. 2004. The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Freedman, Lawrence. [1998] 2003. Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases. Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.

Freeman, Chas. W Jr. 1997. Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. [1993] 2002. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Perennial.

Genest, Marc A. 2004. Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving theories of International Relations. 2nd Ed. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.


Griffiths, Martin. 1999.Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations. London: Routledge.

Haddad, Yvonne and Barbara Stowasser. 2004. Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity. Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press

Hefner, Robert W. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. New Jersey: Princeton.

Held, David, and Anthony McGrew. 2000. The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Holsti, K.J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional change in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster

Isakovic, Zlatko. 2000. Introduction to a Theory of Political Power in International Relations. England: Ashgate Publishing

Ivanov, Igor S. 2002. The New Russian Diplomacy. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Johnsson, Christer & Hall, Martin. 2005. Essence of Diplomacy. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Kegley, Charles Jr, and Eugene Wittkopf. World Politics: Trends and Transformation. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.

Kegley, Charles Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond. 2002 Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Kissenger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Touchstone.

Kleveman, Lutz. 2003. The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in central Asia. Great Britain: Atlantic Books.

Kolodziej, Edward A. 2005. Security and International Relations. New York: Cambridge Univ Press.

Lapidus, Ira M. [1988]2002. A History of Islamic Societies. 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press.

Laslett, Peter. [1960]1988. John Locke: Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press.

Lawson, Stephanie. 2003. Europe and the Asia-Pacific: Culture, Identity and Representations of Region. London: Routledge Curson.

Mansbach, Richard W. & Rhodes, Edward J. 2003, Global Politics in a changing World. 2nd Ed.Boston: Mifflin.

Miall, Hugh. [1994]1996. Redefining Europe: New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation. London: Pinter.

Moon, Jeremy, and Bruce Stone. 2002. Power and Freedom in Modern Politics. Crawley: Univ of Western Australia Press.

Nagel, Stuart S. 2000. Handbook of Global International Policy. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.

O’Hagan, Jacinta. 2000. Contending Images of World Politics. Great Britain: MacMillan Press.

Pasha, A. K. 2000. India, Iran and the GCC States: Political Strategy and Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Manas Publications.

Roberts, Jonathan M.1988. Decision-Making during International Crises. New York: St Martin’s Press

Rumer, Boris. 2005. Central Asia At the end of the Transition. New York: M. E. Sharpe.

Scholte, Jan A. 2005. Globalization a Critical Introduction 2nd Ed. Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan.

Smith Karen E. [2000]2003. European Union: Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Stiles, Rendall W. 2004. Case Histories in International Politics. 3rd Ed. New York: Pearson Education.

Trenin, Dmitri. 2002. The End of Euroasia: Russia on the border between Geopolitics and Globalization. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Viswanathan, Gauri. 2001. Power, Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said. New York: Vintage Books.

Vital, David. 1967. The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations. London: Oxford Univ Press.

Watson, Adam. [1982]1984. Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States. London: Routledge