International Norms and placement of Strategic Nuclear Assets

International Norms and placement of Strategic Nuclear Assets
A liberal State has had to compete with many new non-state actors that may have similar or in some respects greater economic, technical or ideological power as that can be attributed to the State. The State to compete on the international stage has probably had to court such actors to ensure its survivability and enhance its position within the positive sum game architecture that is associated with the liberal political economic system. Improvements in technology increase in demand for natural resources and increases in the ecological global awareness has made States more accountable within a global context for their constituents.

A State or non-state actor needs to consult an international body to ensure that if it decides to build a nuclear power reactor, the effects of that reactor are not felt by a neighbouring State. If the nuclear reactor is built in the vicinity of a shared resource as with water or a protected environmental site it would need to consult the neighbouring State or global body to ensure that the building is representative of internationally accepted standards. This would ensure the safety of the water resource to be continually utilised by the State, the region and the global community.

A society that’s political system is known for instability or not popularly supported domestically or internationally when considering the acquisition of a strategic nuclear asset would need to consult an international organisation to ensure that the many risks and ramifications have been adequately considered in the design, architecture and resourcing of the plant. This would be a necessity to ensure that the State conducting the building is aware of its accountability and ensure that all measures are taken to reduce the possibility of a nuclear incident.

If a projected site for a strategic nuclear asset is located within an area of instability and the State cannot unilaterally assure the security or safety of that asset it is doubtful that international approval would be forth coming to assure the building or placement of the strategic nuclear asset. However, the development of internal conflict is usually slow and with the current interdependence nature of the international system, it would be easy to monitor on an international level. With reform the current international liberal system allows for measures to be easily implemented by the international community to prevent further escalation and possibly reversion of the situation ensuring the attainment of stability.

Many multinational corporations have taken on the position of supplying the resources and technology for the development of nuclear strategic assets. States need to monitor the national interests to assure that the social contract with the constituents is upheld and their security and wellbeing are assured when dealing with these multinational corporations. To effectively achieve this, the monitoring needs to be in accordance with international norms and regulations. It is in the international community’s interest that an international body ensures that a State is not pressured in any way by a multinational corporation with regards to the placement and running of a nuclear strategic asset. Especially if it appears that the State is unable to independently after acquisition or at the end of the contracted period with the multinational corporation to financially maintain the asset to ensure its security and safety.

The previous paragraphs have dealt with issues of State decision-making and the legitimacy that is attributed to the State for effecting decisions that in today’s international system with its interdependent architecture regularly have international ramifications. These international ramifications maybe either directly attributed to the decision made by the State or indirectly attributed to changes within the international system that are influenced by such a decision. The decision to build a nuclear power reactor by a State that is noted for internal conflict would most likely not be supported by the international community. Even if the States intentions were genuine. This behaviour under current conditions would result in regulatory retaliatory action. This would be either, provision of conventions or implementation of sanctions preventing the acquisition of a nuclear power reactor. Sanctions the alternative for conventions are able to be applied by the international society through the employment of an international institutions. They are self-regulatory tools encouraging States to conform to a form of conduct that is considered as a norm. (refer footnote १) Conventions and sanctions ensure States are afforded certain freedoms, are treated equally and with due respect as is the expectation within the commonly accepted principles of interaction for international society. (refer footnote २) Sanctions only have a certain period of time for effectiveness. “The freeze on $25 million of the leadership’s assets held at Bianco Delta Asia in Macau irritated the North Koreans. It did not prevent Kim Jong-il from ordering a ballistic missile test last July or an underground nuclear test in October.” (refer footnote ३)

Significant reform would need to be implemented by the State to ensure that it was able to meet the standards set by the international community to ensure that it complied with the security requirements and safe operating of such a facility and that the internal conflict would not cause concern for the safe running or security. This has not been replicated under current institutional structures. Considering India’s history with the nuclear NPT there is an inconsistency on support afforded to it and that afforded to Iran for the development of a civilian nuclear program. India is known to have nuclear weapons but is not recognised by the NPT and Iran has supported the nuclear NPT by allowing for inspections of its civilian nuclear program. Both States reside in conflict prone environments.

The difference between India and Iran is that India has signed an agreement with its nuclear foe, Pakistan with regards to the use of nuclear weapons whilst Iran continues to publicly denounce the right for Israel to exist.(refer footnote ४) This places a significant moral and ethical burden on the international community as to whether a State openly showing such hostility should be able to continue with a nuclear program. The current Nuclear NPT institution does not have the authority to forcibly intervene for the prevention of nuclear weapons development or use, or prevent the theft or sabotage of a nuclear reactor by the State or non-state actor. Non-state actor represented by either an international terrorist or criminal organisation. The adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1747 (2007) depends on the faith of participating States to enforce the recommendations listed as a means of leveraging Iran into conforming with international requirements as stipulated by Articles I and II of the nuclear NPT. (refer footnote ५)

In this context it appears that the Westphalian system, where States are to be treated equally is not being applied. The signing of an agreement is not legally binding where as the transparency of publicly denouncing the right for a state to exist and allowing for inspections of nuclear facilities provides adequate warning of possible use of weapons if they were actually to be developed. To date no substantial evidence has been forwarded that Iran has actually developed a nuclear weapons capability.

Footnotes

1 Evan Luard, International Society, Hampshire, 1990, p63. Evan Luard further identified that sanctions are responsible for creating self-regulating mechanisms by providing the subject with an interest against violation: where the interest to avoid the sanction is a moral conscience decision and in doing so ensures that the subject conforms with the norm. The pattern of behaviour that is considered desirable or in particular circumstances the normal form of behaviour.
2 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights in International Relations, 1986, Cambridge, p. 115
3 Ian Bremmer, The False Promise of Sanctions, 10 April 2007, ProNews@list.CarnegieEndowment.org
4 People’s Daily Online. India and Pakistan sign deal on nuclear weapons, 2007 February 21, Online [Available] http://english.people.com.cn/200702/21/eng20070221_351648.html [2007 April 12] and MacDonald, Scott B. & Novo, Andrew. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions and the Price of Oil. KWR International. 2006, March 6, Online [Available] http://www.kwrintl.com/library/2006/IransNuclear.htm [2007 April 12]
5 United Nations, Resolution 1747 (2007) 24 March 2007. Online [Available] http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf [2007 April 12]