Nuclear technology - Policing Policy and Sovereignty

A re-evaluation is a requirement that needs to be seriously considered by the States as the pursuit of environmentally friendly power sources has seen a growth in nuclear technological expertise and knowledge. The United Nations requires transferral of appropriate powers from the States to effectively and efficiently intervene for the settlement and prevention of disputes. They need to develop effective policies, treaties and powers for the IAEA to prevent the misuse of or loss of nuclear technological expertise or knowledge. The probability of a nuclear incident occurring is greatly increased with the current flow towards increased dependence on nuclear for energy. The powers attributed to the IAEA needs international recognition that action can be taken if a State is or is not a signatory of the Nuclear NPT. A nuclear incident does not stop at borders. Their powers only relate to nuclear strategic assets, peaceful and weapons as a form of quality control. They can not take action or report on other matters. The forfeiting of sovereignty for a States nuclear strategic assets assures the State's sovereignty. Refer the sovereignty issue associate with the Panama Canal.

The implementation of effective policies and policing mechanisms, would allow for nuclear weapons to come under the control of the international community, allow for a States prestige in the eyes of the international community and most importantly will prevent nuclear knowledge, material and expertise from being accessed by rogue elements of the international community. States that choose to add nuclear weapons to their armament would be able to maintain their sovereignty rights and with their acknowledged prestige would be able to effectively administer their trade requirements in a transparent manner. The state maintains command and administration. Ensuring that their national interests are met. This is provided that they have proven through effective interstate nuclear diplomacy and application that internal conflict or trans-border conflict by either state or non-state actors has not been driven underground. They need to show that effective negotiation has occurred and form of appeasement reached. The security and safety arrangements implemented by the State would need to reflect this unique situation and prove to be effective against a possible resurgence of such activity.

The desire to add nuclear weapons to a State’s armament would be at a significant financial administrative cost to the State. The prestige, the influence on the balance of power within the international system initially identified as an advancement for the State over time would most likely be identified as an unfavourable position. The financial, resource and moral cost would place the State in an inferior position. This cost would be subject to the financial and resourcing requirements as stipulated by set international standards for acquiring the technology and expertise. The State would also be subjected to the projected ongoing costs for the safe storage, maintenance, audit and disposal of such armaments. This ensures the integrity of the system and the integrity of the security and safety architecture developed and implemented by the IAEA and overseen by the United Nations.

This view is identified as a feasible option to the current international construct for management of nuclear weapons. In relation to the prisoner dilemma theory, this view places the State in an inferior position to if they had not pursued nuclear weapons at all. Both a State identified with or without internal conflict would be required to implement appropriate security and safety measures to ensure that the technology and fissile material is not lost or moved out of State administration.

Historically, States that have pursued nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence for their foreign policy; have been reluctant to actually use them in conflict even as a last resort. Strategic policy usually classifies weapons as first strike or second strike in theory but in practice they have not actually been employed. They have not prevented conventional warfare from occurring, but the thought of a State developing nuclear weapons without international oversight has provoked international intervention. Something that can be avoided with a policy review on the sovereignty of strategic nuclear assets.